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INTRODUCTION

The twentieth century, especially the last four decades, has
brought about significant developments and changes in the accounting
profession and in the exposure of accountants to liability. The aggregation of great sums of capital by commercial enterprises, the increased
complexity of modem business, the high degree of government regulation of business affairs and the repeated occurrence of major financial
debacles have been elemental factors in bringing about these developments and changes.' Concomitantly, increasing reliance has been
placed on independent accountants to scrutinize financial statements
and detect financial improprieties. 2 This increased reliance has occasioned significant developments in accountants' exposure to liability.
In the past, accountants were "watchdogs," but they were not expected to be "bloodhounds." 3 Their liability was limited by traditional
common law principles, 4 and the practice of the accounting profession
was controlled largely by the profession itself, with relatively little government involvement.5 In addition, business did not rely as heavily on
the investing public for capital, and thus there was considerably less
6
exposure of accountants to public scrutiny.
Significant changes in common law liability principles, 7 enactment
of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and the Securities Ex1. See generally J. CAREY, THE RISE OF THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION (1969); D.
CAUSEY, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF THE CPA (1973); N. MILLER, THE GREAT SALAD OIL
SWINDLE (1965); SEC Accounting Series Release No. 19 (1940), 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
72,020; Shaw, Liability of Public Accountants to Third Parties,46 A.L.R.3d 979 (1972);

Gormley, Accountants' ProfessionalLiability - 4 Ten-Year Review, 29 Bus. LAW. 1205
(1974).
2. See, e.g., Committee on Corporate Law and Accounting, CorporateResponsibility In
the Financial4ccountingand DisclosureAreas: Who Makes and Who Implements the Rules?

34 Bus. LAW. 1979, 1999-2005 (1979) (remarks of A.A. Sommer, Jr.).
3. Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889). See In re Kingston Cotton Mill Co., 2 Ch.
279 (1896).
4. See generally Adams, Lessening the Legal LiabilityofAuditors, 32 Bus. LAW. 1037,

1039 (1977). See notes 325-62 infra and accompanying text.
5. See generally Committee on Corporate Law and Accounting, CorporateResponsibility In the FinancialAccountingand DisclosureAreas: Who MakesAnd Who Implements the
Rules, 34 Bus. LAW. 1979 (1979); J. CAREY, THE RISE OF THEAcCOUNTINo PROFESSION,
181-92 (1969).
6. See, e.g., Hawes, Truth in FinancialStatements: An Introduction,28 VAND. L. REv. 1
(1975); Earle, The FairnessMyth, 28 VAND. L. REv. 147 (1975). Cf.Douglas, Directors Who
Do Not Direct,47 HARV. L. REv. 1305 (1934) (increased reliance on public for aggregation
of great sums of capital requires heightened awareness of responsibilities by professionals
involved in the process).
7. See notes 325-62 infra and accompanying text.
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change Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), the increasing dependence of the
business sector on the public for capital, coupled with an increasing
dependence on the expertise of independent accountants, have antiquated many of the principles thought to be true decades ago. This
increased dependence on accountants has brought about a considerable
increase in the number of lawsuits against accountants and accounting
firms, and has resulted in some of the largest judgments awarded by the
judiciary.8 As Judge Timbers, writing for the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in a recent case involving an accounting
firm, said: "This is another in a series of cases which are occupying
with increasing frequency the attention of the federal courts. They involve the responsibility of certified public accountants in preparing and
certifying financial documents." 9
As recently as the late 1970's, federal legislation was enacted that
places substantial responsibility on accountants and, in all likelihood,
foreshadows new territory in the area of accountants' liability.1 0 In addition, the 1970's ended with significant governmental attention and
debate on the accounting profession's ability to govern and police itself." Finally, the past decade ended with the distinct possibility that
new regulatory proposals will be implemented that will add to the already far-reaching responsibilities of the profession.1 2
This article examines the developments and changes that have occurred in the accounting profession during the last several decades.
The article will first examine these subjects in the context of the federal
securities laws, including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977
and administrative proceedings by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The article next explores the developing exposure of
accountants to criminal liability. Finally, it addresses accountants' liability under the common law.
I.

DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE FEDERAL SECUIUTIES LAWS

Some areas of accountants' liability and responsibility under the
federal securities laws have received considerable attention,' 3 while
8. See, e.g., Hawes Truth in FinancialStatements: An Introduction,28 VAND. L. RPv. I

(1975); Earle, The FairnessMyth, 28 VAND. L. Rav. 147 (1975); New York Times, May 1,
1971, at 41, col. 6 (a $4.95 million settlement in connection with the Mills Factorcase).
9. Robertson v. Seidman & Seidman, [Current] FED. SEc. L. RaP. (CCH) 97,100, at
96,055 (2d Cir. Aug. 29, 1979).
10. See notes 213-45 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 242-45 infra and accompanying text.
12. See notes 236-45 infra and accompanying text.
13. See notes 22-94 infra and accompanying text.
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others are uncharted, or are still in the proposal stage of the regulatory

process.' 4 For example, accountants' liability has been examined in
cases involving the express liability provisions,' 5 as well as the antifraud provisions' 6 of the federal securities laws. On the other hand,
the recent enactment of the Foreign C6rrupt Practices Act of 1977'1
8
may result in the imposition of new responsibilities on accountants,'

and will no doubt bring about new claims of liability on behalf of public investors and others. In addition, the SEC is actively scrutinizing
the ability of the profession to regulate itself,' 9 posing the undeniable
threat that federal legislation may eventually regulate the profession. 20
Finally, in the interest of providing increased protection to the investing public, the SEC has recently adopted rules designed to encourage

accountants to associate themselves with filed quarterly financial statements. These developments could heighten the exposure of accountants to liability. 21 All of these factors, and others, place the accounting
profession in a dynamic state of affairs.
A.

Civil Liability Under the SecuritiesActs

-

An Overview

The express liability provisions under the federal securities laws
germane to accountants are found in sectibns 11 and 12 of the Securi-

ties Act22 and section 18 of the Exchange Act.'

In addition, liability

14. See notes 213-45 infra and accompanying text.
15. See notes 29-51 infra and accompanying text.
16. See notes 52-94 infra and accompanying text.
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
18. See notes 213-35 infra and accompanying text.
19. See notes 242-45 infra and accompanying text.
20. See note 245 infra.
21. See notes 236-45 infra and accompanying text.
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k-771 (1976). Section I1 of the Securities Act of 1933 [hereinafter
Securities Act] imposes liability on a host of persons, expiessly including accountants, for
material misstatements or omissions in a registration statement filed with the SEC which has
become effective. A "due diligence" defense is expressly provided in section I 1(b) which is
applicable to accountants. The contours of this defense were shaped in the landmark cases
of Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), and
Escott v. BarChris Const. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
Section 12 of the Securities Act imposes liability on any person who offers or sells a
security in violation of the registration provisions of the Act or who offers or sells a security
by means of a prospectus or oral communication which includes an untrue statement of
material fact or omits to state a material fact. In the usual case, liability under Section 12
may only be imposed by persons purchasing directly from the person who offers or sells a
security in violation of the section. See Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc.,
448 F.2d 680, 692 (5th Cir. 1971); McFarland v. Memorex Corp., [Current] FED. SEc. L.
RaP. (CCH) 97,368 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 1980). See also Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon,
378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967) (provision of section affords relief to purchasers only); Jenkins
v. Fidelity Bank, 365 F. Supp. 1391 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (issuing corporation had no right under
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has been imposed on accountants via judicially implied private rights
§ 12(2) to recover from one who participated in the preparation of a misleading offering
circular); Ruszkowski v. Hugh Johnson & Co., 302 F. Supp. 1371 (W.D.N.Y. 1969) (brokerage house not liable to investor since no privity existed between brokerage house and plaintiff at time of sale of bonds). But see Freed v. Szabo Food Serv., Inc., [1961-1964 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,317 (N.D. Ill. 1964) (lack of privity will not bar an
action where plaintiff's purchase was in reliance on misrepresentation and defendant participated in the misrepresentation).
When the alleged violator is not the person who offers or sells the security, but is integrally connected or substantially involved with the offer or sale, liability may be imposed on
him. See Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617, 621 (5th Cir. 1973); Mendelsohn v. Capital
Underwriters, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,169, at 96,445 (N.D. Cal. Oct.
24, 1979). See also Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283, 1287 (4th Cir. 1978). While one could
argue that an accountant is integrally connected or substantially involved in the offer or sale
of a client's securities because the securities could not be sold without the audit certification
of the accountant, the countervailing argument would appear to have merit. See Katz v.
Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1969). The accountant performs his professional
function by rendering an opinion on the financial statements of the entity whose securities
are offered or sold and has no direct involvement in the distribution process. Under section
12, the alleged violator's liabilty is expressly limited "to the person purchasing such security
from him." An accountant who renders an opinion on financial statements does not offer or
sell securities. Moreover, no person purchases securities from the accountant.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1976). Section 18 imposes liability on any person who makes or
causes to be made any materially false or misleading statement in any application, report or
document filed with the SEC under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter
Exchange Act]. Several courts have held that section 18, by its express language, is limited
to documents actually "filed" with the SEC. Rich v. Touche Ross & Co., 415 F. Supp. &5
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (language of section construed according to its terms and is no broader than
its plain meaning); In re Falstaff Brewing Corp. Antitrust Lit., 441 F. Supp. 62 (E.D. Mo.
1977) (complaint failing to indicate that alleged material misrepresentations were contained
in reports filed pursuant to section 18 was insufficient to sustain an action). But see SEC v.
Keller Indus., Inc., 342 F. Supp. 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (an interim quarterly report circulated
to the public can be actionable if materially misleading).
Until recently, because annual reports to stockholders were often separate and apart
from the Annual Reports on Form 10-K filed with SEC, section 18, under the majority view,
presumably did not apply to the reports disseminated to stockholders. Thus, accountants
were not subject to section 18 liability for such reports. See Kulchok v. Government Employees Life Ins. Co., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,002
(D.D.C. Mar. 31, 1977). They were subject, however, to the liability created by the section
for financial statements which they certified and which were included in reports or documents such as Annual Reports on Form 10-K filed with the SEC. See id. However, on
August 2, 1980, the SEC adopted amendments to Form 10-K, regulation S-K, and rules 14a3 and 14c-3. In part, these amendments are designed to facilitate integration of the Securities Act and Exchange Act disclosure systems. The annual report to shareholders, under the
amendments, may become the cornerstone disclosure document upon which the integrated
disclosure system is to be built. In this regard, the principal feature is the establishment of
uniform disclosure requirements for both the Form 10-K and the annual report to shareholders. The restructured Form 10-K requires that certain basic financial information must
be set forth and that this same information, in turn, may be incorporated by reference from
the shareholder's report into the Form 10-K. The amendments call for a more meaningful
analysis of the registrant's business and financial condition including the market price of the
registrant's securities and its statement of dividend policy, selected financial data, management's discussion and analysis of the registrant's financial condition, and supplementary
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of action under section 17(a) of the Securities Act 24 and section 10(b) of

the Exchange Act." While there are certain differences between all of
these liability provisions, 26 as a general proposition, accountants' liabilfinancial information. The amendments also call for discussion of the financial statements
and changes in financial condition in their entirety, hence, prompting registrants to focus on
liquidity and capital resources in addition to income. Apparently due to commentator concern that incorporation might affect readability of the stockholder report, the SEC elected to
make such incorporation from the Annual Report to shareholders into the Form 10-K optional, rather than mandatory, on the part of reporting companies. For those companies that
opt to incorporate by reference, the effect on accountants' exposure to increased liability, if
any, remains to be seen. See Securities Act Releases Nos. 6176-79 (Jan. 15, 1980) and 623134 (Sept. 2, 1980), 20 SEC DOCKET 1060 (Sept. 16, 1980), 568 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
D-1 (Aug. 27, 1980).
24. Lower courts have differed on the question of whether there exists an implied private
right of action under section 17(a) of the Securities Act. See Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank of
Lincolnwood, 509 F.2d 1287, 1293 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976); Globus
v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1283-84 (2d Cir. 1969), cer. denied,397 U.S. 913
(1970). Some courts have held that such an action exists, while other courts have held that it
does not. See notes 96-98 infra and accompanying text. The Supreme Court, on at least
three occasions, has expressly referred to the issue without resolving it. See Aaron v. SEC,
100 S. Ct. 1945, 1949-52 (1980); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 99 S. Ct. 790, 795
n.9 (1979); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733 n.6 (1975).
25. See note 96 infra for a discussion of accountants' liability under section 14(a) of the
Exchange Act. An implied private cause of action for damages has been held to exist under
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404
U.S. 6 (1971). See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). A controversial issue that has arisen is whether an
action under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 can be brought even though the alleged material
misstatements are also actionable under sections 11 and 12(2) of the Securities Act and/or
section 18 of the Exchange Act. For recent decisions regarding this issue, see Ross v. A. H.
Robins Co., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCII) 97,115, at 96,181 (2d Cir. Sept. 24, 1979)
("even as to those documents filed with the S.E.C. plaintiffs may seek to prosecute their
claim under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5"); McFarland v. Memorex Corp., [Current] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCII) 97,368 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 1980) (express remedy provided in § I I precludes relief under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5); McKee v. Federal's, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,958, at 96,020 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 8, 1979) ("[s]ince the § 18
remedy [an express statutory provision] is not available to plaintiff, the invocation of an
implied Rule lob-5 remedy may not be countenanced"); Wachovia Bank & Trust v. National Student Marketing, 461 F. Supp. 999 (D.D.C. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 79-1595
(D.C. Cir.) ("[A]n implied cause of action [under § 10(b)] should be available even where
the alleged misconduct also falls completely within the confines of an express remedy.").
26. For example, sections I 1(b) and 12(2) of the Securities Act expressly place the burden upon the alleged violator to prove that he exercised the degree of care necessary to
exculpate himself from liability. Similarly, section 18(a) of the Exchange Act expressly
places the burden upon the alleged violator to show that he acted in good faith and had no
knowledge that the allegedly false or misleading statement was false or misleading. On the
other hand, section 17(a) of the Securities Act and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act are
both silent on the culpability requirement and on whom the burden of proof rests. However,
the Supreme Court has expressly held that "scienter" must be alleged in a private damage
action under section 10(b). Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Furthermore,
the party alleging the violation has the burden of proof. As stated by the Third Circuit:
In placing the burden of negating scienter upon the defendant, the court appears to

1980]

A CCO UNTANTS' LIABILITY

ity for false or misleading financial statements will turn on the degree
of care exercised in the auditing of and reporting on the statements.
In the landmark case of Escolt v. BarChrisConstruction Corp.,' a
national accounting firm and several of its individual members were
charged with violating section 11 of the Securities Act, which creates
express civil liability for material misstatements or omissions in a registration statement.2 Because certified financial statements are required
in registration statements,2 9 the exposure of accountants under the section is directly implicated. Section 11(a), which designates the persons
who may be held liable, expressly lists accountants.3 0 A party alleging
31
violations of the section need not establish privity with the defendant,
have relied upon language in the Senate Report on S. 3420, S. Rep. No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1934), referring to the express civil liability provisions in the
1934 Act. While the district court's opinion is not completely clear on this issue,
and while we think that a shift in the burden of proof would not have influenced
the outcome of this litigation, we know of no judicial authority relieving a plaintiff
of the burden of going forward or of persuasion on each element of an implied
cause of action under § 10(b)-including scienter. We therefore disapprove any
suggestion in the lower court's opinion that the defendant must affirmatively show
the absence of intent.
McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1196-97 (3d Cir. 1979). See FED. R. EVID. 301. See
also Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980); text accompanying notes 139-45 infra.
27. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See also Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip.
Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), for an extensive discussion of liability under section 11 of the Securities Act.
28. Section I 1(a) liability reaches certain designated persons, see note 30 infra, for "an
untrue statement of a material fact or [the omission] to state a material fact required to be
stated [in a registration statement] or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading."
29. E.g., items 25 and 26 of Schedule A under the Securities Act.
30. Section 1 (a) of the Securities Act provides that any person acquiring a security sold
pursuant to a registration statement which contains material misstatements or omissions
may sue the following parties, unless it is proved that at the time of such acquisition the
person acquiring the security knew of the untruth or omission:
(1) every person who signed the registration statement;
(2) every person who was a director of (or person performing similar functions)
or partner in, the issuer at the time of the filing of the part of the registration
statement with respect to which his liability is asserted;
(3) every person who, with his consent, is named in the registration statement as
being or about to become a director, person performing similar functions, or
partner,
(4) every accountant,engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose profession gives
authority to a statement made by him, who has with his consent been named
as having prepared or certified any part of the registration statement, or as
having prepared or certified any report or valuation which is used in connection with the registration statement, with respect to the statement in such registration statement, report, or valuation, which purports to have been
prepared or certified by him;
(5) every underwriter with respect to such security.
15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
31. 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1731 (2d ed. 1961).
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nor need he ordinarily prove reliance.3 2 Assuming that a timely claim

is made,33 the two principal defenses available to an accountant are, (1)
the complainant knew of the material misstatement or omission,3 4 and
(2) the accountant exercised due diligence and care in auditing and re-

porting on the financial statements. 35 The burden of proving due dili32. The only time that reliance is an issue in a suit brought under section 11 is when the
issuer has issued an earnings statement covering a period of at least twelve months subsequent to the effective date of the registration statement. In that case, the right of recovery is
conditioned upon proof that the person who acquired the security acquired it in reliance
upon the untrue statement in the registration statement or upon reliance on the registration
statement without knowing of the material omission. However, "reliance may be established without proof of the reading of the registration statement" by the aggrieved purchaser. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976). See generallyTurner v. First Wis. Mortgage Trust, 454 F.
Supp. 899 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (plaintiff must prove he purchased a security which was issued in
connection with allegedly false registration statement); Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp.,
365 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (a purchaser is presumed to have relied on a prospectus if
he purchased within twelve months of offering); In re Gap Stores Sec. Lit., 79 F.R.D. 283
(N.D. Cal. 1978) (purchaser must prove reliance on statement issued within twelve months
of registration effectiveness but need not prove he read the statement); JENNINGS & MARSH,
SECURITIES REGULATION 833 (4th ed. 1977).
33. Section 13 of the Securities Act provides that no action to enforce any liability created under section 11 may be brought later than one year after discovery of the untrue
statement or omission contained in the registration statement, or after one year from the
date which such untrue statement or omission should have been, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, discovered. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1976). In any case, suit to enforce a liability
created under section I I may not be brought more than three years after the security acquired was offered to the public. For purposes of the three-year outside limitation provided
in section 13, the date when the time period starts to run "is not earlier than the effective
date of [the] last amendment to the registration statement and not later than the date when
the prospectus is released to, or other solicitation is made of, the public." Fischer v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 391 F. Supp. 744, 747-48 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). At least one case has
held that the issuer's active concealment of violations tolls the running of the three-year
outside limitation for the duration of the concealment. In re Home-Stake Prod. Co. Sec.
Lit., 76 F.R.D. 337, 344-45 (N.D. Okla. 1975).
34. Section 1 l(a) provides that any person who acquires a security issued by means of a
registration statement containing material misstatements or omissions may sue "unless it is
proved that at the time of such acquisition he [the person acquiring the security] knew of
such untruth or omission." 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976). See In re Gap Stores See. Lit., 79
F.R.D. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (a defendant may escape liability by proving plaintiff acquired
the security with knowledge of the alleged untruth or omission); Feit v. Leasco Data
Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (plaintiffs knowledge of omission of material fact provides affirmative defense).
35. Section 1l(b)(3)(B) permits a person upon whose authority as an expert a materially
false or misleading statement is made in a registration statement to escape liability under the
section if such person proves that after reasonable investigation he had reasonable ground to
believe and he did believe that the statements contained in the registration statement were
true and that there was no omission to state a material fact. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(B) (1976).
See Goldstein v. Alodex Corp., 409 F. Supp. 1201 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (reasonable investigation
and belief of truth of statements exonerates defendant); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (reasonable investigation and reasonable
belief requirements vary with the degree of defendant's involvement, expertise and access to
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gence and care is on the defendant.3 6
In BarChris, convertible debentures of BarChris Construction
Corporation, the registrant, were sold to the public by means of a registration statement filed with the SEC. Plaintiffs, who were purchasers of
these debentures, alleged that the registration statement contained material misstatements and omissions. 37 Relief was sought against various
defendants,3 8 including a national accounting firm.
When the court in BarChristurned to consider the liability of the
accountants, it did so with respect to that "part of the registration statement purporting to be made upon the authority of [the accountant] as
an expert."139 The only part of the registration statement made on the
authority of the accountants in BarChriswas, as is usually the case, the
financial statements. In considering the defense that the accountants
acted with due diligence, the court stated that this defense must be assessed at the time that the part of the registration statement containing
the allegedly false and misleading financial statements became effective.40 To accomplish this task, the court scrutinized the audit as well
as the accountants' review of events which occurred after the date of
statement but
the certified balance sheet contained in the registration
41
statement.
registration
the
of
date
effective
the
before
The most blatant error found by the court was the accountants'
failure to discover that a bowling alley constructed by the registrant,
which had been recorded on the books as having been sold, had not
been sold.4 2 In determining whether the accountants should be held
liable for the resulting misstatements in the financial statements, the
court carefully considered the various internal documentary evidence
examined by the accountants during the course of their audit. In addition, the court considered certain accounting records which had not
been examined but which, if examined, would have put the accountants
data; accountants must investigate to the same extent a reasonably prudent person in that
position would).
36. Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Co., 332 F. Supp. at 576.
37. 283 F. Supp. at 652.
38. The defendants fell into three categories: (1)the persons who signed the registration
statement (Le., the registrant, nine of its directors, some of whom were also officers, and the
registrant's controller); (2) eight investment banking firms which acted as underwriters in the
offering; and (3) the registrant's auditors, a national accounting firm. 283 F. Supp. at 652.
39. Id. at 698.
40. Id. Section Il(b) requires that the due diligence defense be considered as of "the
time such part of the registration statement [containing the misstatement or omission] became effective." 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(B)(i) (1976).
41. 283 F. Supp. at 697-703.
42. Id. at 699.
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on notice of the impropriety.4 3 After reviewing the audit procedures in
this context, the court concluded that the accountants failed to prove
that they had conducted a reasonable investigation and consequently,
their ignorance of the true facts was unjustified. 44
In this aspect of the case, it is unclear whether the court's conclusion was based on the finding that the accountants failed to examine
certain records which would have put them on notice of the impropriety, or whether the documents examined put them on notice and they
failed to follow up.45 The facts suggest the latter, which appears to be
the proper and reasonable standard of care to impose on accountants
with respect to certified financial statements contained in a registration
statement. Once put on notice of an impropriety, an accountant should
be required to diligently unearth sufficient information to establish a
complete understanding of the matter if he is to render an audit opinion on the financial statements.4 6
In scrutinizing the accountants' review of events subsequent to the
date of the certified financial statements but prior to the effective date
of the registration statement, the court concluded that the written work
program utilized for the review conformed to generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS), 47 and would have provided the accountants
with the due diligence defense had it been complied with. 48 The program, with limited exceptions, only required a cursory review of the
financial statements and certain specific accounts. Significantly, however, the court criticized the accountants for obtaining answers which
they considered satisfactory without attempting to verify them.4 9 Thus,
while limited review procedures may suffice as to "subsequent events,"
the court added the gloss that information obtained and examined in
the course of such a review must be independently verified.
43. Id. at 699-700.
44. Id. at 700.
45. Id. at 698-700.
46. See United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953
(1964). The court in BarChripstated: "But there were enough danger signals in the materials which [the accountant] did examine to require some further investigation on his part.
Generally accepted accounting standards required such further investigation under these
circumstances." 283 F. Supp. at 703. See SEC v. Chatham, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,911, at 95,757 (C.D. Utah June 6, 1979).
47. 283 F. Supp. at 701.
48. Id. at 701-03.
49. For example, at one point the court stated: "He asked questions, he got answers
which he considered satisfactory, and he did nothing to verify them." Id. at 702. See also
id. at 703. The court was also critical of the accountants' review of subsequent events in that
it noted that there were records that the accountants should have examined in conducting
their review but did not. .d. at 702.
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From an overall perspective, the court in BarChris believed that
accountants "should not be held to a standard higher than that recognized in their profession. ' 50 Presumably then, proof of compliance
with GAAS is sufficient to establish a due diligence defense. In addition, in conducting a subsequent events review, an accountant need not
perform a complete audit, but any danger signals in materials must be
pursued and answers must be verified."
52
In the court of appeals decision in Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst,
subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court on different grounds, the
Seventh Circuit was content to follow the lead of BarChris.5 3 This case
involved a fraudulent securities scheme perpetrated by the president of
a brokerage firm. The plaintiff-investors sought recovery against a national accounting firm that had audited the brokerage firm, alleging
that the negligent audit aided and abetted the fraud perpetrated by the
president. 4
Although the Supreme Court subsequently reversed the decision,
holding that negligence did not suffice to state a private cause of action
for damages under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and rule lOb-5,5 5
the court of appeals decision is instructive on the standards by which
an accountant's audit must be judged. In this regard, the court held
that in performing an audit, accountants "are required to meet only the
standard of care reasonably expected of persons holding themselves out
as skilled accountants. '5 6 The court, therefore, agreed with the opinion
in BarChris,which stated that "accountants should not be held to a
standard higher than that recognized in their profession. ' 57 Thus, despite the fact that Ernst & Ernst involved alleged violations of section
10(b) of the Exchange Act and rule lOb-5, while BarChrisinvolved violations of section 11 of the Securities Act, the standard of care imposed
on accountants in both cases apparently was the same.58 This, however, does not change the fact that the level of culpability required to
50. Id. at 703. See notes 74-94 infra and accompanying text.
51. Id. at 700-03.
52. 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd on othergrounds, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
53. Id. at 1107-11.
54. Id. at 1103-04.
55. See notes 106-114 infra and accompanying text.
56. 503 F.2d at 1107-08.
57. Id. at 1108.
58. For a case in which a court looked to generally accepted auditing standards to determine the adequacy of an accounting firm's audit of financial statements included in a proxy
statement, and thus involving alleged violations of section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and
rule 14a-9 thereunder, see Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCI-)
97,382 (6th Cir. May 2, 1980). See note 96 infira.
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establish violations of these sections is different. 9
The court in Ernst & Ernst,however, was careful to point out that

compliance with GAAS is not an absolute defense to a charge of negligence or carelessness in the performance of an audit.6 0 Relying on an
earlier decision by Judge Learned Hand, 61 the court stated that compli-

ance with GAAS should not bar recovery where GAAS is found to be
faulty.62 Rather, a court should first be satisfied that GAAS reflects
professional practice constituting reasonable prudence before it allows
compliance therewith to be invoked as a shield to liability. While

GAAS may be quite persuasive in determining the proper standard of
care,.the "[c]ourts must in the end say what is required; there are precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse their omission. "163
Recently, in SEC v. Arthur Young & Co.," the Ninth Circuit affirmed the principle that compliance with GAAS is, in the usual case, a

viable defense.6 " Arthur Young involved a suit by the SEC against a
national accounting firm and certain of its individual members alleging
violations of section 17(a) of the Securities Act, section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and rule lOb-5 and certain reporting provisions of the

Exchange Act. 66 The claimed violations by the accounting firm and its
auditors allegedly resulted from their audits of false and misleading

financial statements.
The SEC argued that a standard different from compliance with
GAAS should be applied in assessing liability. The court noted that:

During oral argument the SEC appeared to take the position
59. See notes 93-146 infra and accompanying text.
60. 503 F.2d at 1113.
61. The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
62. As the court stated, "the teaching of The T. J.Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932), is
not lost to us for we recognize that we are not constrained to accept faulty standards of
practice otherwise generally accepted in an industry or profession." 503 F.2d at 1113.
63. Id. at 1113 n.16 (quoting, The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d at 740).
64. 590 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1979).
65. Id. at 787-89. As the court noted:
"Generally Accepted Accounting Principles" (GAAP) establish guidelines relating
to the process by which the transactions and events of a business entity are measured, recorded, and classified in accordance with a conventional format. GAAS
[Generallf Accepted Auditing Standards] thus differs from GAAP; the former involves how an auditor goes about obtaining information, while the latter involves
the format in which to present the information.
Id. at 789 n.4. As for GAAS, the court stated:
"Generally Accepted Auditing Standards" (GAAS) are general standards of conduct relating to the auditor's professional qualities as well as to the judgments exercised by him in the performance of his examination and issuance of his report.
Id. at 788 n.2 (citation omitted).
66. Id. at 786.
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that the proper standard is whether the accountant performed
his audit functions in a manner that would have revealed to
an ordinary prudent investor, who examined the accountant's
audits or other financial statements, a reasonably accurate re-

flection of the financial risks such an investor presently bears
or might bear in the future if he invested in the audited endeavor.67
The court flatly rejected the SEC's argument, stating that to accept

it would make the accountant "an insurer of his client's honesty and an
enforcement arm of the SEC."' 68 The SEC's position would, according
to the court, "conscript" accountants to the service of the SEC, which

the court refused to do.6 9 It went on to hold, without distinguishing
between the sections of the securities acts alleged to have been violated,

that the accountants discharged their professional obligation by complying with GAAS. In holding that GAAS was the proper measure by
which to assess the accountants' liability, the court was careful to point
out, as other courts have done in the past, that actual knowledge or a
deliberate disregard of material misstatements or omissions destroys
the defense.7 0
Generally speaking, the lead of BarChrisas to the proper standard

of care, but not as to state of mind, has been followed 7' irrespective of
which section of the Securities Acts was allegedly violated. 72 Accordingly, it appears that compliance with GAAS, adequately pleaded, 3
67. Id. at 787-88.
68. Id. at 788.
69. The court was quite critical of the SEC's position: "The difficulty with this [the
SEC's position] is that Congress has not enacted the conscription bill that the SEC seeks to
have us fashion and fix as an interpretive gloss on existing securities laws." Id.
70. The basis for the court's qualification of the principle that compliance with GAAS
will act as a shield from liability was its agreement with the Second Circuit's decision in
United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,397 U.S. 1006 (1970). See
notes 82-94 & 303-10 infra and accompanying text.
71. See notes 53-70 supra*andaccompanying text; Fiffis, Current Problems of AccountanttrResponsibilitiesto ThirdParties,28 VAND. L. Rav. 31, 67-87 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Fiflis].
72. See Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,382
(6th Cir. May 2, 1980) (role of GAAS in case of alleged violations of sections 14(a) and 14(e)
of the Exchange Act); Seiffer v. Topsy's Int'l, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,352
(D. Kan. Mar. 19, 1980).
73. In an action against an accountant alleging fraud, it is not sufficient to simply plead
that audited financial statements are materially false and misleading and that the accountant
acted recklessly or willfully in not discovering or disclosing it. The specificity requirement
of FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) requires that the plaintiffs: specifically identify the acts or omissions
on which the charge is based; describe the documents in which the allegedly false and misleading statements appear and state with specificity what items in these documents are false;
state the factual basis from which an inference of the defendant's recklessness or willfulness
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will, in the usual case, be a shield to charges of carelessness. It is vitally
important, however, to point out that this shield only relates to an accountant's care in obtaining essential underlying facts. Compliance
with GAAS will not be a shield to liability where an unreasonable
judgment is made on the basis of adequate information properly ob-

tained. The decisions scrutinizing accountants' audit procedures have
at the same time considered the reasonableness of the judgments made
on the basis of the information unearthed during the audit.7 4

In addition, compliance with GAAS will not act as a shield from
liability for misleading presentation of information obtained during the
course of a properly conducted audit. 75 In other words, the "investigative" portion of the audit, in which the accountant obtains evidential

matter to support the information ultimately presented in financial
statements, is only the first step in the evaluation of liability. The next

step is to scrutinize the judgments made by the accountant on the basis
of the information obtained," and the final step is to scrutinize the fairness of the financial statements taken as a whole.77 When financial

statements are alleged to be false or misleading, carelessness at any of
the three levels can lead to liability.
can be drawn; state the factual basis from which an inference that the defendant had a duty
to act or disclose can be drawn; and, where the pleadings are based on information and
belief, state the facts upon which the belief is founded. See, e.g., Ross v. A.H. Robins Co.,
[Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T97,115, at 96,191-92 (2d Cir. Sept. 24, 1979); Denny v.
Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 468-70 (2d Cir. 1978); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d
374, 378-79 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); McFarland v. Memorex Corp.,
[Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,368 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 1980); Trio Laboratories,
Inc. v. Herman, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,284 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 1980); Harris v. Emerson, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,196, at 96,573 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3,
1979). According to a number of courts, a general allegation that an item in the financial
statements was inadequately presented will not satisfy FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Harris v. Emerson, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,196, at 96,573 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 1979); Gross v.
Diversified Mortgage Investors, 438 F. Supp. 190, 194-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). See Ross v.
Warner, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,194 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 1979); Wildman v.
Wills, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,152 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 1978); Weinberger v.
Kendrick, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,378 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4,
1978).
74. See notes 76-94 infra and accompanying text.
75. See notes 78-94 infra and accompanying text.
76. In United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,397 U.S. 1006
(1970), involving a criminal prosecution of accountants, the court stated that expert testimony concerning the accountants' "honest judgment" in preparing financial statements was
"highly persuasive" evidence, but not "conclusive." .d. at 806.
77. See, e.g., SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785, 788-89 (9th Cir. 1979); Herzfeld
v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27, 35-37 (2d Cir. 1976); United
States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 806 (2d Cir. 1969), cer. denied,397 U.S. 1006 (1970); In re
Commonwealth Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Corp. Sec. Lit., 467 F. Supp. 227, 255 (W.D. Tex.
1979).

1980]

ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY

It is in the last of the three steps, i e., presentation of the financial
statements, that generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)
come into play. GAAP deals with the proper reflection of economic
events in comprehensible financial statements."8 Thus, while an accountant may comply with GAAS in an audit, the failure to comply
with GAAP in the presentation of financial statements may be a basis
for liability. 9 On the other hand, and more importantly, compliance
with GAAP in financial statement presentation will not necessarily absolve an accountant of liability.
The shield from liability provided by GAAP seems less protective
than the shield provided by GAAS. Generally, compliance with
GAAP demonstrates adherence to professional norms and thus evidences some measure of propriety.8 0 This concept derives from the tort
law principle that compliance with the standards established by a profession reflects due care. 8 ' In the case of accountants' liability for materially false or misleading financial statements under the federal
securities laws, however, this principle is far from absolute.
In UnitedStates v. Simon, 2 a criminal suit was brought against a
national accounting firm for allegedly false and misleading disclosures
in publicly disseminated financial statements. The government alleged
inadequate disclosure of and accounting for a large sum reflected in the
financial statements as an amount receivable which, although not disclosed in the financial statements, was indirectly owed by the company's president.8 3
Numerous expert witnesses testified on behalf of the accountants;
each witness essentially agreeing that the disclosure made was in accordance with GAAP and thus was fair." Defendants argued that the
78. AMERICAN INsTrruTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD, Accounting Principles §§ 1026.01-.02 (1970). See note 65 supra.

79. United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d at 806.
80. See id.
81. As Judge Learned Hand stated in The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932):
There are, no doubt, cases where courts seem to make the general practice of calling the standard of proper diligence; we have indeed given some currency to the
notion ourselves.... Indeed in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly
lagged in the adoption of new and available devices. It never may set its own tests,
however persuasive be its usages. (citations omitted).
Id. at 740. See also Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1113 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd
on other grounds,425 U.S. 185 (1976).
82. 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,397 U.S. 1006 (1970).
83. Id. at 801.
84. As the court in Simon stated:
The defendants called eight expert independent accountants, an impressive array
of leaders of the profession. They testified generally that, except for the error with
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tesf of the fairness of disclosure should be judged on the basis of
GAAP8 5 and that because GAAP did not require disclosure other than
that made, liability should not follow. The court concluded, however,
that the fairness of the disclosure did not turn on whether it complied
with GAAP. Judge Friendly, writing for the court and agreeing with
the lower court, stated that the litmus test is whether the financial statements as a whole are fair, and proof of conformity with GAAP is persuasive but not conclusive.8 6 While testimony of experts may be
87
considered, the ultimate question of fairness rests with the jury.
Five years after Simon, the district court for the Southern District
of New York, later affirmed in pertinent part by the Second Circuit,
decided Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath.88
Herzfeld involved a suit by shareholders of a bankrupt company
against the company's independent accountants. Plaintiffs alleged that
the accountants violated section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and rule
lOb-5 by certifying false and misleading financial statements. The alleged deficiencies centered around a $13 million transaction as a result
of which the company reported approximately two million dollars in
current and deferred income.8 9 The accountants qualified their audit
opinion because of this transaction and explained it in footnotes to the
financial statements.
The accountants asserted compliance with GAAS in the conduct
of their audit and with GAAP in making the disclosure as a defense. 90
The district court rejected these arguments, referring to GAAP as "esoteric accounting norms, comprehensible only to the initiate." 91 The
courtradded that liability should be based on whether the financial
statements presented "the true financial position of [the company]...
respect to netting, the treatment of the Valley receivable in Note 2 was in no way
inconsistent with generally accepted accounting principles or generally accepted
auditing standards, since it made all the informative disclosures reasonably necessary for fair presentation of the financial position of Continental as of the close of
the 1962 fiscal year.
425 F.2d at 805.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 806. But f Hirsch v. duPont, 553 F.2d 750, 761 (2d Cir. 1977), in which the
Second Circuit appears to have assumed that compliance with GAAP is a defense to an
allegation of violations of rule 17a-5 of the Exchange Act which deals with net capital statements required by broker-dealers.
87. 425 F.2d at 805-06.
88. 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976), affg inpart, rev'g in part, 378 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
89. 378 F. Supp. at 118.
90. Id. at 121.
91. Id.
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to the untutored eye of an ordinary investor." 92
Thus, it may be that compliance with GAAP may not act as a

shield from liability. Instead, the ultimate test is simply the "fairness"
of the financial statements taken as a whole. As stated by the district
court in Herzfeld:

Compliance with generally accepted accounting principles is
not necessarily sufficient for an accountant to discharge his
public obligation. Fair presentation is the touchstone for determining the adequacy of disclosure in the financial state-

ments. While adherence to generally. accepted accounting
principles is a tool to help achieve that end, it is not necessarily a guarantee of fairness. 93

The function of financial statements is enlightenment. Enlightenment means more than mathematical or literal accuracy. Taken as a

whole, financial statements must fairly present the financial status of a
company. While GAAP may be a useful guide in determining fairness,

it is by no means dispositive.
A determination that an accountant did not comply with GAAS in
the conduct of an audit or that financial statements do not fairly pre-

sent the financial status of a company does not end the inquiry on the
issue of liability. While the inquiry may be at an end in the case of a
claim asserted, for example, under section 11 of the Securities Act, it
certainly is not in many other cases. In these other cases, the issue of

liability will require a determination of the accountant's culpability, assuming the complainant did not know and should not have known of
94
the misstatement or omission.

92. Id.
93. Id. at 122 (quoting Sonde, The Responsibility of ProfessionalsUnder the FederalSecurities Laws-Some Observations,68 Nw. U.L. Rav. 1, 3 (1973)). Accord, In re Commonwealth Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Corp. Sec. Lit., 467 F. Supp. 227, 255 (W.D. Tex. 1979).
94. The courts will not permit an aggrieved plaintiff to recover for alleged violations of
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws where it is shown that the plaintiff was
put on notice of the fraud and failed to investigate it with due diligence to learn the truth. In
other words, purchasers must diligently follow up warnings or signals that a fraud has been
perpetrated before they will be entitled to relief. See. e.g., Robertson v. Seidman & Seidman, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,100, at 96,057-60 (2d Cir. Aug.
29, 1979); Hirsch v. duPont, 553 F.2d 750,763 (2d Cir. 1977); Rice v. Baron, [Current] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,200, at 96,583-84 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 1979); Oleck v. Fischer, [1979
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,898, at 95,701 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 1979), af'd,
[Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,525 (2d Cir. June 4, 1980). But see Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,262, at 96,854 (2d Cir. Jan. 25, 1980)
("a plaintiffs burden is simply to negate recklessness when the defendant puts that in issue,
not to establish due care").
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CulpabilityStandards

Liability against accountants for defective financial statements will
often be sought on the basis of violations of section 17(a) of the Securities Act, or sections 10(b) or 18(a) of the Exchange Act.95 Each of these

sections contains,96 either expressly or by judicial implication, a culpability requirement.
The courts that have permitted implied private damage actions
under section 17(a) of the Securities Act 97 have split on the culpability
95. In cases of mergers and tender offers, liability against accountants may also be
sought under sections 14(a) and'14(e) of the Exchange Act and the rules promulgated thereunder. See generally Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, [Current] FED. SEC. L. RP. (CCH)
1 97,382 (6th Cir. May 2, 1980).
96. See notes 84-93 infra and accompanying text. In Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills,
[Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,382, at 97,516 (6th Cir. May 2, 1980), the Sixth
Circuit took the position that scienter is required in private damage actions against accountants for audited false and misleading financial statements contained in proxy statements. In
taking this position, the court noted that other circuits have prescribed a negligence standard
under section 14(a) when the defendant is the corporation issuing the proxy statement. Id.
at 97,514 (citing Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777-78 (3d Cir.
1976), and Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1300-01 (2d Cir. 1973)). Accord,
Bertoglio v. Texas Int'l Co., [Current] FED. SaC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,342, at 97,276 (D. Del.
Mar. 7, 1980). The Supreme Court, however, has expressly left this question open. Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 209 n.28 (1976). The Sixth Circuit in Adams went on to
conclude that scienter was required in an action under section 14(a) against accountants
because, among other things, accountants are so removed from the issuing corporation and
do not stand to benefit from a misleading proxy statement. [Current] FED. SEC. L. RaP.
(CCH) 97,382, at 97,514-16. The validity of this analysis is debatable in view of the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980), where the Court
refused to construe section 10(b) of the Exchange Act differently on the basis of the plaintiff's identity. Id. at 1952. Query whether sections 10(b) or 14(a) should be construed differently on the basis of the defendant's identity?
97. The principle that an implied private right of action for damages exists under section
17(a) of the Securities Act does not enjoy universal acceptance. See, e.g., McFarland v.
Memorex Corp., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,368 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 1980) (no
implied private right of action based on application of Redinglon and Lewis); In re New
York Mun. Sec. Lit., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,258 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 1980)
(no implied right of action under § 17(a) based on legislative history and construction of
§§ I1 and 12(2)); Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890, 903-05 (N.D. Me.
1971) (legislative history and statutory construction clearly indicate that section 17(a) was
not intended to provide a private damage remedy).
However, a substantial body of case law has either held or assumed that such an action
exists. See, e.g., Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir. 1978), cer. denied, 99
S. Ct. 2821 (1979) (by implication); Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97, 99 (4th Cir. 1975) (section
17(a) provides implied private damage action to protect investors from fraudulent sale of
securities); Demoe v. Dean Witter & Co., [Current] FED. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) 97,282 (D.
Alaska Sept. 7, 1979) (private right of action under § 17(a)(3) but not under § 17(a)(1) or
§ 17(a)(2)); Valles Salgado v. Piedmont Capital Corp., 452 F. Supp. 853, 857-58 (D.P.R.
1978) (section 17(a) provides implied private damages remedy for fraudulent purchase of
mutual fund shares). Cf. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 488 F.2d 912, 914 (4th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied,416 U.S. 916 (1974) (by implication) (action for rescission of oil and gas produc-
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requirement of that section. Some have indicated that scienter is required to state a cause of action,98 while others have concluded that
only negligence is required. 99 The Supreme Court's recent decision in
Aaron v. SEC °° arguably may signify that if an implied private cause
of action is ultimately held to exist under section 17(a), negligence will
suffice for the last two of the three subparts of the section while scienter
will be required for the first.' 0 '
tion payment; private cause of action under § 17(a)); Smith v. Jackson Tool & Die, Inc., 419
F.2d 152, 154 (5th Cir. 1969) (by implication) (case remanded for trial on issue of liability
for damages under § 17(a)); Collins v. Signetics Corp., 443 F. Supp. 552, 555 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(by implication) (claim for relief under § 17(a)(2) must assert purchaser-seller privity); Doffman v. First Boston Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1089, 1095 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (upholding implied
private right of action under §§ 17(a)(1) and 17(a)(3); section 17(a)(2) action subject to § 12
limitations). See generally Hazen, A Look Beyondthe Pruningof Rule 10b-5i ImpliedRemedies and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 64 VA. L. REv. 641, 647-58 (1978);
Steinberg, Section 17(a) of the SecuritiesAct of1933 After Naftalin andRedington, 68 GEO.
L.J. 163, 172-85 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Steinberg]. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
referred to the question without resolving it. See note 101 infra.
98. See, e.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 795 (7th Cir. 1977) (scienter
must be proven in a private cause of action for damages under §§ 17(a)(1) and 17(a)(3)
because of the references to fraud in these subsections; § 17(a)(2) does not expressly refer to
fraud, thus implying, but not explicitly stating that scienter is not necessary under this subsection.). But see Wiener v. Oppenheimer & Co., [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,764, at 95,002 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1979) (scienter required in private suit for
damages under section 17); Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1089, 1095 (E.D.
Pa. 1972) (by implication) (negligence not sufficient to state a cause of action for damages
under section 17(a)). See notes 99-101 infra and accompanying text.
99. See cases cited in note 98 supra. See also Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945, 1956 (1980)
(scienter not required under sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) in SEC injunctive actions);
Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1132-33 (5th Cir. 1979), pet.for cert. granted on other
grounds, 100 S. Ct. 1849 (1980) (scienter not required under sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) in
SEC administrative proceedings; scienter required under section 17(a)(1)); SEC v. Coven,
581 F.2d 1020, 1026-27 & n.1 1 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.denied, 440 U.S. 950 (1979) (scienter not
required under sections 17(a)(1) and 17(a)(3) in SEC injunctive action).
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of
any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976). For an analysis of the various subsections of section 17(a), see
Steinberg, supra note 97.
100. 100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980).
101. Since Aaron dealt with the state of mind requirement under section 17(a) in SEC
injunctive actions, the Court did not determine whether an implied private right of action
exists under the section. Id. at 1949-52. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 99
S. Ct. 790, 795 n.9 (1979); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733 n.6
(1975). The Court did decide, however, that scienter is required under section 17(a)(1) in
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As for the culpability requirement under section 18 of the Exchange Act, the section expressly states that "good faith" is a defense to

liability.0 2 The precise meaning of good faith is not clear. There is
respectable authority, however, for the proposition that "good faith"

means "something more than negligence" but something less than actual intent. 03 As Professor Loss put it, good faith "seems to be first
SEC injunctive suits, while it is not required under sections 17(a)(2) or (3). Aaron v. SEC,
100 S. Ct. 1945, 1956 (1980). The analysis followed in Aaron was similar to that followed in
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), where the Court held that on the basis of
the language of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, scienter was required to state an implied
private cause of action for damages under the section and rule lOb-5. Note, however, that
regardless of Aaron's implications, due to the limitations contained in the express remedy
under section 12(2), scienter may possibly be deemed to be required in private damage actions pursuant to section 17(a). See Steinberg, supra note 97, at 175-85. See also notes 10510 & 136-45 infra and accompanying text.
102. Section 18(a) of the Exchange Act provides:
Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement in any application,
report, or document filed pursuant to this chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder or any undertaking contained in a registration statement as provided in subsection (d) of section 78o of this title, which statement was at the time and in the
light of the circumstances under which it was made false or misleading with respect
to any material fact, shall be liable to any person (not knowing that such statement
was false or misleading) who, in reliance upon such statement shall have purchased
or sold a security at a price which was affected by such statement, for damages
caused by such reliance, unless theperson suedshallprove thathe actedin goodfaith
andhadno knowledge that such statement wasfalse ormisleading. A person seeking
to enforce such liability may sue at law or in equity in any court of competent
jurisdiction. In any such suit the court may, in its discretion, require an undertaking for the payment of the costs of such suit, and assess reasonable costs, including
reasonable attorneys' fees, against either party litigant.
15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976) (emphasis added). For an analysis of section 18(a), see Ross v. A.
H. Robins Co., [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,115, at 96,186-90 (2d
Cir. Sept. 24, 1979). See also McKee v. Federal's Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. Svc. L.
REP. (CCH) 96,958, at 96,023-24 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 8, 1979). For a discussion of the possible limitations imposed by section 18 on section 10(b) and rule lob-5, see note 25 supra.
103. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 209 n.28, 211 n.31 (1976). In
Hochfelder, the Supreme Court noted that with the exception of section 16, each of the
express civil liability provisions of the Exchange Act, including section 18, contains a culpability requirement of "something more than negligence." Id. (emphasis added). The Court's
discussion of the state of mind requirement under that section appears to support the argument that something less than actual intent will nevertheless suffice to state a cause of action
under the section. As the Court stated:
Liability [under section 18] is limited, however, in the important respect that the
defendant is accorded the defense that he acted in "good faith and has no knowledge that such statement was false or misleading." Consistent with this language,
the legislative history of the section suggests something more than negligence on
the part of the defendant is required for recovery. The original version of § 18(a),
provided that the defendant
§ 17(a) of S. 2693, H.R. 7852 and H.R. 7855 ....
would not be liable if"he acted in good faith and in the exercise of reasonable care
had no ground to believe that such statement was false or misleading." The accounting profession objected to this provision on the ground that liability would be
created for honest errors in judgment. See Senate Hearings on Stock Exchange
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In addition, under section 18(a) the burden of

proving "good faith" is placed on the defendant. 105
The culpability requirement under section 10(b) has received differing treatment depending on the identity of the plaintiff and the fo-

rum in which suit has been brought."

In Ernst & Ernst v.

Hochfelder,'°7

the Supreme Court held that scienter is a required element of a private damage action under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. 08
The Court defined scienter as "a mental state embracing intent to

deceive, manipulate or defraud."''

9

In a footnote, however, the Court

specifically refused to determine whether "recklessness" constitutes sci-

enter under the section and the rule, stating that "[i]n certain areas of
the law recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct
for purposes of imposing liability for some act. We need not address

here the question whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior is
sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5."

0

Since

Practices,. .. House Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720,.
In subsequent
drafts the current formulation was adopted.
Id. at 211-12 n.31.
104. 3 L. Loss, SECuURmTas REGULATION 1752 (2d ed. 1961).
105. See authorities cited in notes 102 & 103 supra.
106. Prior to Aaron, where the SEC had been the plaintiff in civil injunctive suits, some
courts had held that negligence was sufficient to state a cause of action under section 10(b)
and rule lOb-5, while other courts had held that scienter was required. See notes 105-10 &
136-45 infra and accompanying text. The Commission has rejected Hochfelder's application
in SEC administrative proceedings. See notes 208-12 infra and accompanying text.
107. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Hochfelder is one of several recent Supreme Court decisions
restricting the reach, scope and effect of the federal securities laws. See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC,
100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980) (scienter required in SEC injunctive suits under section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors,
Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242 (1979) (no implied private right of action under section 206 of
the Investment Advisers Act; limited implied private right of action under section 215);
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 99 S. Ct. 2479, 2486 (1979) (no implied private right of
action for damages under § 17(a) of the Exchange Act); International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Daniel, 99 S. Ct. 790, 798 (1979) (interest in noncontributory compulsory pension plan not a
"security" subject to regulation under Securities Acts); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 111-12
(1978) (limiting SEC's right to summarily suspend trading in registered securities for successive 10-day periods); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977) (breach of
fiduciary duty, without fraud, deception, or misrepresentation not actionable under section
10(b) of the Exchange Act); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 28 (1977) (defeated
tender offeror has no standing to bring implied private right of action for damages under
section 14(e) of the Exchange Act); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
749 (1975) (only purchasers and sellers have standing to bring implied private cause of action for damages under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act). See generally Lowenfels, Recent
Supreme Court Decisions Underthe FederalSecuritiesLaws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEO.
L.J. 891 (1977).
108. 425 U.S. at 193.
109. Id.
110. Id. at n.12.
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Hochfelder, numerous appellate courts, including the Second, Third,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits have concluded that recklessness constitutes scienter as defined in Hochfelder.1 '
It is clear from Hochfelder that negligence will not suffice to state a
private cause of action for damages under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5,2
that recklessness may suffice and that actual intent does suffice."
While the lower courts since Hochfelder have not been unanimous in
their interpretation of the scienter requirement, 1 3 many have 4concluded that recklessness will suffice in a private damage action."
"Recklessness" has been variously defined by the courts. For example, in what now appears to have become a seminal case, Rolf v.
Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co.,"' the Second Circuit, quoting in part
from an earlier Seventh Circuit decision, defined recklessness in the
context of aider and abettor liability where a fiduciary duty existed, as
"at the least, conduct which is highly unreasonable and which represents 'an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care ... to
the extent that the danger was either known to the defendant or so
obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it.' 116
111. E.g., Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,268
(3d Cir. Jan. 29, 1980); Keirnan v. Homeland, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,248 (9th Cir. Jan. 15, 1980); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017,1024-25
(6th Cir. 1979); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,439 U.S. 970
(1978); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38,44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,439 U.S.
1039 (1978); Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Berman, 567 F.2d 569, 574 (3d Cir. 1977), cerl. denied,
439 U.S. 830 (1978); First Va. Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1314 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033,
1039-40 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,434 U.S. 875 (1977).
112. Various passages in the Hochfelder decision can be read to support each of these
propositions. For example, at the outset of the decision, the Court stated:
Although the extensive legislative history of the 1934 Act is bereft of any explicit
explanation of Congress' intent, we think the relevant portions of that history support our conclusion that § 10(b) was addressed to practices that involve some element of sc/enter and cannot be readto impose liability/ornegligent conduct alone.
425 U.S. at 201 (emphasis added). At another point in the decision, the Court stated:
"There is no indication that Congress intended anyone to be made liable for such [manipulative and deceptive, or illicit] practices unless he acted other than in goodfaith. The catchall
provision of § 10(b) should be interpreted no more broadly." Id. at 206 (emphasis added).
In another portion of its opinion, the Court concluded: "mhe judicially created private
damages remedy under § 10(b). . .cannot be extended, consistently with the intent of Congress, to actionspremised on negligent wrongdoing." Id. at 210 (emphasis added). At yet
another point, the Court stated: "[W]e are quite unwilling to extend the scope of the statute
to negligent conduct." Id. at 214. Finally, the Court also noted "that § 10(b) and Rule lOb5 might be held to require proof of more than negligent nonfeasance." .d. at 215.
113. See notes 114-42 infra and accompanying text.
114. See note 111 supra and accompanying text.
115. 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978).
116. 570 F.2d at 47 (quoting in part, Sanders v. John Nuveen Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th
Cir. 1977)).
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In a footnote in the Rolf decision, the Second Circuit expressly left
open the question of whether a less strict test than that quoted would
satisfy the "recklessness" requirement in other situations."I7 The lesser
test referred to was the one set forth by the district court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin in Stern v. American Bank Shares Corp. 1 8 In
Stern, the court described what must be asserted to establish a charge
of recklessness:
What the plaintiff must allege is that the defendants knew or
should have known of the facts and circumstances concerning
the fraud, le., the transaction which forms the basis for the
violations, and that they either actively rendered assistance in
an effort to further that transaction or failed to disclose the
material facts in violation of a duty to do so. 119
The Roff definition of recklessness is manifestly different than the
Stern definition in that Rof requires a higher degree of culpability.
Hochfelder can be read to have held only that negligence does not suffice to state a private cause of action for damages under section 10(b)
and rule lOb-5.12 0 Consequently, an allegation that the defendant
"should have known" but for his negligence is not actionable. Presumably, however, an allegation that the defendant "should have known"
but for conduct in excess of negligence might be actionable. Indeed,
this appears to be the standard that the Stern court adopted. Unlike
the language used by the Second Circuit in Rolf, which viewed recklessness as "highly unreasonable" conduct that represents "an extreme
departure from standards of ordinary care," the Stern court was satisfied that the standard of "should have known of the facts and circumstances concerning the fraud" would suffice.
Courts in a number of decisions have preferred alternative approaches.'12
For example, the Ninth Circuit, which, prior to
117. 570 F.2d at 47 n.16.
118. 429 F. Supp. 818 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
119. Id. at 827.
120. See notes 106-14 supra and accompanying text.
121. The Second Circuit itself, prior to Hoehfelder, adopted an alternative approach. See,
e.g., Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 n.98 (2d Cir. 1973) ("the inquiry normally
will be to determine whether the defendants knew the material facts misstated or omitted, or
failed or refused, after being put on notice of a possible material failure of disclosure, to
apprise themselves of the facts where they could have done so without any extraordinary
effort"). Accord, Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 478 F.2d 115, 123 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,414
U.S. 857 (1973). See generally Steinberg v. Carey, 439 F. Supp. 1233 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). But
see Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 126 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (more stringent standard applied; actual knowledge required), aft'd inpart andrev'd in
part,540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F. Supp. 879, 889 (E.D.
Pa. 1978) (more stringent standard applied; recklessness sufficient). For a discussion of the
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Hochfelder rejected an unequivocal application of scienter and instead
adopted a flexible duty standard in private damage actions under rule
lOb-5,122 now appears to have adhered to the flexible duty standard,
with some modification, after Hochfelder.12 3 In the view of the Ninth

Circuit, the "terminology, analysis, sand citation to authority [in
Hochfelder] lend credence to a broad interpretation of scienter."' 2 4 In

broadly interpreting "scienter," the Ninth Circuit has concluded that
"knowing" conduct is within the ambit of section 10(b) and rule lOb5125

If the alleged wrongdoer is "aware"' 2 6 of the relevant facts which

form the basis for the alleged fraud, a cause of action exists. The
wrongdoer's conduct need not be so extreme as to be labeled "deliberate and cold-blooded."'' 27 At times, the Ninth Circuit has deviated
from the flexible duty standard. 28 One such occasion was in Keirnan v.
different standards, see Oleck v. Fischer, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,898, at 95,698-701 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 1979), aft'd, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,525 (2d Cir. June 4, 1980). Some district courts in the Second Circuit treat the preHochfelder standard as good law. See Greene v. Emersons, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 97,266, at 96,865-68 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 1980); Oleck v. Fischer, [1979 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,898, at 95,678-701. In a recent decision, the Ninth
Circuit adopted a liberalized pre-Hochfelder Second Circuit standard. Keirnan v. Homeland, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,248, at 96,748 (9th Cir. Jan. 15, 1980).
For a detailed discussion of the various recklessness standards adopted by the courts, see
Steinberg & Gruenbaum, Variationsof 'ecklessness" after Hochfelder and Aaron, 8 SEc.
REG.L.J. 179 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Steinberg & Gruenbaum].
122. Prior to Hochfelder, the circuits varied on the scienter requirement in private damage actions under section 10(b). Compare White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir.
1974) (flexible duty standard; negligence can suffice) and Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 735
(8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968) (negligence suffices), with Clegg v. Conk,
507 F.2d 1351, 1361-62 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,422 U.S. 1007 (1975) (some element of
scienter or conscious fault required) and Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d
Cir. 1973) (willful or reckless disregard of truth required). See generally, Bucklo, Scienter
andRule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 562, 568-70 (1972).
123. E..-, Kidwell v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273, 1294 (9th Cir. 1979); Spectrum Financial
Cos. v. Marconsult, Inc., 608 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 2153 (1980);
Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1336-38 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,439 U.S. 970 (1978). Cf.,
SEC v. Blazon Corp., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP.(CCH) 97,212, at 96,614 (9th Cir. Dec.
17, 1979). The Ninth Circuit's statement in Blazon that negligence suffices to state a cause of
action under section 10(b) in an SEC injunctive suit is consistent with its prior liberal interpretations of the section. But see Aaron v. SEC, 100 S.Ct. 1945 (1980) (scienter required to
state cause of action under § 10(b) in SEC injunctive suit). See also White v. Abrams, 495
F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1974).
124. Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,439 U.S. 970 (1978).
125. Id.
126. Kidwell v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273, 1294 (9th Cir. 1979).
127. Spectrum Financial Cos. v. Marconsult, Inc., 608 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2153 (1980); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 970 (1978).
128. See, e.g., Keirnan v. Homeland, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP.(CCH) 97,248
(9th Cir. Jan. 15, 1980); Lewis v. Anderson, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP.(CCH) 97,153 (9th
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Homeland, Inc.,'2 9 where the court adopted a liberalized preHochfelder Second Circuit approach, 130 concluding that the defendants
acted recklessly "if they had reasonable grounds to believe material
facts existed that were misstated or omitted, but nonetheless failed to

although they could have done so withobtain and disclose such facts
13 1
out extraordinary effort."

The Rof court's acceptance of a recklessness standard was predicated on the condition that the defendant first be found to have either a

fiduciary duty or a duty to disclose to the defrauded party. 132 In cases
where there is no such duty, the logic of Rof may not apply and recklessness may not suffice.1 33 There are, however, cases that have applied

the recklessness standard even when such a duty did not exist. 134 These
cases have found recklessness to be sufficient when it was foreseeable
by the defendant that the defrauded party would rely on the defendant's conduct. Thus, while an independent accountant may not have a

fiduciary responsibility to investors in general with respect to his audit
opinion, it may often be foreseeable that investors will rely on the accountant's opinion. As stated by one court, the recklessness standard
will apply when "an accountant has reason to foresee that his audit or
opinion letter will be relied upon by third parties."' 135 As for the quesCir. Oct. 29, 1979); Ritzau v. Warm Springs West, 589 F.2d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir. 1979). See
Steinberg & Gruenbaum, supra note 121.
129. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,248 (9th Cir. Jan. 15, 1980).
130. Id. at 96,748. See Second Circuit cases cited in note 121 supra.
131. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,248, at 96,748.
132. 570 F.2d at 44.
133. The Ro/fcourt expressly left open the question of whether recklessness suffices when
there is no fiduciary duty to the defrauded party. Id. at 44 n.9. In a subsequent decision,
however, the Second Circuit declined to hold a defendant liable as an aider and abettor
under a recklessness theory when the defendant lacked a fiduciary relationship with the
plaintiff, and an actual intent to aid in the fraud could not be established. Edwards & Hanly
v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478, 485 (2d Cir. 1979). See Competitive
Assocs., Inc. v. Laventhol, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) 97,150, at 96,346-48
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 1979); Steinberg & Gruenbaum, supra note 121.
134. Oleck v. Fischer, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,898, at
95,699 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 1979), aft'd, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,525 (2d Cir.
June 4, 1980). Accord, Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F. Supp. 879, 888 (E.D. Pa. 1978);
McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1082 (D. Del. 1976), rev'd on othergrounds, 599
F.2d 1190, 1196-97 (3d Cir. 1979). See Steinberg & Gruenbaum, supra note 121.
135. Oleck v. Fischer, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,898, at
95,699 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 1979), af'd [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,525 (2d Cir.
June 4, 1980). See Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F. Supp. 879, 888 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
When ai accountant has reason to foresee that third parties will rely on his certification
or other work, he may be deemed to have a duty of disclosure running to the third parties.
E.g., Mendelsohn v. Capital Underwriters, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,169, at 96,449-50 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 1979); Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279, 283 (9th Cir.
1971); In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Sec. Lit., 416 F. Supp. 161 (C.D. Cal. 1976). See
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tion of whether an accountant in the ordinary case has a disclosure
duty to persons who utilize certified financial statements, the answer
may well be in the affirmative:
The task of an independent accountant is fairly to report a

company's financial status at a particular time. It is by now
basic that when an accountant certifies a financial statement it
represents to those who see the statement that the figures are

accurate in all material respects; a relationship is thus created
between the accountant and those who see the statement
which gives rise to certain duties of disclosure. On the basis
of this representation, the accountant may be held liable
under Rule lOb-5 for the preparation of false or misleading

financial statements which portray36 an inaccurate picture for

the period covered by the report.'
With respect to whether scienter is required in SEC injunctive

suits, the Court, in a footnote in Hochfelder, expressly left this question
open. 137 While the lower courts had split on the question, with some

holding that scienter is required and others holding that it is not,

38

the

generally Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 1973) (liability imposed for silence or
inaction when duty to disclose has arisen); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417
F.2d 147, 154 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970) (silence or inaction can be
basis for aiding and abetting liability); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d
Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (silence can be basis for liability).
For an analysis of when a duty to disclose on the part of an accountant arises, see
Spectrum Financial Cos. v. Marconsult, Inc., 608 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100
S. Ct. 2153 (1980). See generally Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979).
136. Ingenito v. Bermec Corp., [1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,214,
at 92,487 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 1977) (citations omitted). See Gold v. DCL, Inc., 399 F. Supp.
1123, 1127 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See also Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976). The court in Ingenito, added: "Where financial statements
have been certified and released to the public, courts have imposed a continuous duty to
disclose after-acquired information which casts doubt on the reliability of the certified
figures with respect to theperiodcoveredby the audit." Id. at 92,487 (emphasis added) (citing
Hirsch v. duPont, 553 F.2d 750, 761 (2d Cir. 1977)); United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F. Supp.
879 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 189-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)). But see
Seiffer v. Topsy's Int'l, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,352 (D. Kan. Mar. 19, 1980).
137. 425 U.S. at 194 n.12.
138. Compare those cases that upheld the scienter requirement, e.g., SEC v. Blatt, 583
F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Wills, 472 F. Supp. 1250 (D.D.C. 1978); SEC v. Cenco,
Inc., 436 F. Supp. 193, 200 (N.D. Ill. 1977); SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226,
1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aft'don othergrounds, 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977) (not reaching scienter
issue), with those cases that suggested or held that negligence sufficed, e.g., SEC v. Blazon
Corp., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,212, at 96,614 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 1979); SEC
v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1979); SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544
F.2d 535, 541 n.10 (1st Cir. 1976); SEC v. Geotek, 426 F. Supp. 715, 726 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
See generally Lowenfels, Scienteror Negligence Requiredfor SEC Injunctions Under Section
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question was definitively answered in the Supreme Court's recent decision in Aaron v. SEC,13 9 which applies the analysis used in Hochfelder,
and holds that scienter is a necessary element in an SEC injunctive
action brought under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. 14

The pre-Aaron rationale underlying the argument that scienter is
not required in SEC injunctive actions was that such actions are for the
purpose of maximizing the protection of public investors and therefore,
the government should not be as constrained in implementing these
protections as private investors are when they seek monetary dam-

ages.' 4 1 As a matter of policy, limiting the government's burden to
showing negligence in enforcement actions increases the effectiveness
of the government's efforts and this increased effectiveness outweighs
42
the potential harm to those enjoined from violating the law.'
The pre-Aaron logic supporting the argument that scienter is required in government enforcement actions is also plausible. The argument asserts that it is inappropriate to construe the statute differently
on the basis of the plaintiff's identity. 4 3 If scienter is required in private damage actions and this requirement is compelled by the language

of the statute itself, scienter should be required in government enforcement actions under the statute. Indeed, this is the rationale that the
Court used in Aaron.1" As a side note, it merits attention that this

argument does not rebut the assertion, as the Court in Aaron concluded, that negligent culpability suffices in SEC injunctive actions
brought under some subsections of section 17(a) of the Securities
Act, 14 5 where the language is nearly identical to rule lOb-5 or where the
10(b) andRule 10b-5: A FascinatingParadox,33 Bus. LAW. 789 (1978); Berner & Franklin,
Scienter and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule JOb-5 Injunctive Actions: A Reappraisalin Light ofHochfelder, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 769 (1976); Comment, Scienter and SEC
Injunctive Suits, 90 HARv. L. Rv. 1018 (1977).
139. 100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980).
140. Id. at 1952. The Court, however, also held that while scienter is required under
section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act, it is not required in SEC injunctive suits brought under
sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3). Id. at 1956.
141. SEC v. Aaron, 605 F.2d 612, 621 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated, 100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980). See
generaly SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 541 n.10 (1st Cir. 1976); SEC v.
Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541-42 (2d Cir. 1973).
142. SEC v. Aaron, 605 F.2d at 612.
143. Id. See SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1333 (5th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Wills, 472 F.
Supp. 1250 (D.D.C. 1978). See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 217 (1976)
(Blackman, J., dissenting) ("the question whether negligent conduct violates the Rule should
not depend upon the plaintiffs identity").
144. 100 S.Ct. at 1952-53.
145. Id. See Steinberg & Gruenbaum, supra note 121, at 197-99, and cases cited therein.
In Aaron, the Court concluded that scienter was required under section 17(a)(1) but not
under 17(a)(2) or (3).
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language does not dictate the conclusion that Congress intended to in-

clude a scienter requirement.
C. Injunctive and Other EquitableRelief Against Accountants
Related to the question of scienter is the role that culpability plays
in the relief that courts are willing to grant in SEC enforcement actions.

Historically, suits by the SEC were limited to injunctive relief146 be-

cause the pertinent provisions of both securities acts 147 expressly limit

the right of the SEC to such relief. While a literal reading of the statutes may arguably dictate such a limitation, the courts in recent years
and have granted various forms of ancillary or other
have gone further
14
equitable relief. 1

1. Injunctive actions
The critical issue in determining whether an injunction should is-

sue is whether there is a reasonable likelihood or threat of future violations. 14 9 Absent an atirmative answer to this question, an injunction
should not issue. This principle is well settled by federal case law.150
In UnitedStates v. Oregon State Medical Society,' 5 ' the Supreme
Court refused to enjoin a defendant medical society from violations of
the Sherman Antitrust Act when the illegal activity had stopped and

there was no threat of future violations. The violations in question
were voluntarily abandoned seven years prior to the commencement of
the government's suit.'

In discussing the appropriateness of an in-

junction under such circumstances, the Court pointed out that, "[t]he
sole function of an action for an injunction is to forestall future violations." 153 Finding that the trial court record did not unearth any threat
of a resumption of the illegal activities, the Court concluded that an
146. See Farrand, AncillaryRemedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits, 89 HARV. L. REv.
1779 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Farrand].
147. Securities Act of 1933, § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (1970); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 21, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d) (West Supp. 1979). See notes 166-67 infraand accompanying text.
148. See notes 168-69 infra and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945, 1957 (1980); SEC v. Koracorp Indus., Inc.,
575 F.2d 692, 697-99 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); SEC v. Commonwealth
Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 98-101 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d
8, 18-19 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633-36 (1953); United
States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 333-34 (1952); SEC v. Parklane Hosiery
Co., 558 F.2d 1083, 1089-90 (2d Cir. 1977). See notes 160-61 infra and accompanying text.
150. See cases cited in note 149 supra, and notes 151-61 infra and accompanying text.
151. 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
152. Id. at 329-30.
153. Id. at 333.
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54
injunction should not issue.1
In UnitedStates v. W. T Grant Co.,"' the Supreme Court affirmed

summary judgment for several defendant corporations in a suit in
which the government sought to enjoin W. T. Grant Co. and others

from future violations of the Clayton Act. The Court accepted the
lower court's findings that the defendants' past violations had been voluntarily terminated and that the defendants had no intention of resuming the practices sought to be restrained.' 5 6 While noting that the
voluntary cessation of the allegedly illegal activities did not automatically require the denial of an injunction, the Court emphasized that
"[t]he moving party must satisfy the court that relief is needed. The

necessary determination is that there exists some cognizable danger of
recurrent violation, something more than the mere possibility which
serves to keep the case alive."' 7 In addition, the Court noted that the
determination of whether to issue an injunction is within the discretion
of the trial court. 5 '
In recent years, the SEC has failed in a number of cases to obtain
injunctions against various defendants, including accountants, for al-

leged violations of the federal securities laws.' 59 In most of these cases,
the controlling question has been whether there existed a reasonable

likelihood or danger of future'violations160 To answer this question,
154. Id. at 334. ("The record discloses no threat or probability of resumption of the
abandoned warfare against prepaid medical service and the contract practice it entails. We
agree with the trial court that conduct discontinued in 1941 does not warrant the issuance of
an injunction in 1949."). See Industrial Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 64, 83-84 (1925).
155. 345 U.S. 629 (1953).
156. Id. at 634-36.
157. Id. at 633. See generally SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 18 (2d Cir. 1977);
SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 558 F.2d 1083, 1089 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Edwards,
333 F.2d 575, 579 (5th Cir. 1964); SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241, 249 (2d Cir. 1959).
158. United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 633. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S.
321, 328 (1944); Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 235 (1943); United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 338-39 (1952) (lower court's findings not clearly
erroneous); SEC v. Blazon Corp., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,212, at 96,614-15
(9th Cir. Dec. 17, 1979).
159. See, e.g., SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1979) (Big Eight accounting firm); SEC v. Koracorp Indus., Inc., 575 F.2d 692 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,439 U.S.
953 (1978) (Big Eight accounting firm). See generally SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565
F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977); SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977); SEC v.
Bangor Punta Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), af'd ub norm Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,414 U.S. 910 (1973); SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971); SEC v. Pearson, 426 F.2d 1339 (10th
Cir. 1970); SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978)
(mem.).
160. The courts appear to vary on the degree of the threat or danger of future violations
that must exist before an injunction will issue. The vast majority of courts, however, employ
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the courts have looked at a number of factors, including: the seriousness and number of the defendant's past violations; the cessation or
continuance of the illegal conduct; the defendant's promises of reformation and acts of contrition; evidence of the defendant's remorse;
changed circumstances relating to the defendant's job or health; and

the degree of the defendant's culpability, or lack thereof, in committing
the alleged violations. 161 As the Court recently observed in Aaron,
is only one factor in determining whether to
proof of past violations
62
issue an injunction. 1

In several recent cases involving suits against professionals and
professional firms, the courts have questioned the appropriateness of
enjoining an entire firm for the alleged misconduct of only one or a few

of its members.' 63 There is clearly a stigma associated with the issuance of an injunction. In the accounting profession, as well as in other
the "reasonable likelihood" standard. See, e.g., SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 18
(2d Cir. 1977) ("reasonable likelihood that past wrongdoing will occur"); SEC v. Parklane
Hosiery Co., 558 F.2d 1083, 1089-90 (2d Cir. 1977) ("reasonable likelihood of recurrence");
SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241, 249 (2d Cir. 1959) ("reasonable expectation of recurrence"). Cf.Chris-Craft.Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 405 (2d Cir.), cer.
denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973) ("must be a showing of cognizable risk of future violation,
something more than the mere possibility which serves to keep the case alive;" defendant
must have a propensity or natural inclination to commit future violations); SEC v. Cenco,
Inc., 436 F. Supp. 193, 200 (N.D. IlM.1977) (there must be more than a "mere possibility of
recurrence"); SEC v. Griffin, 296 F. Supp. 883, 887 (S.D. Miss. 1968) (court must look to the
"likelihood or probability, as distinguished from the possibility, of future violations").
161. SEC v. Bonastia, 614 F.2d 908 (3d Cir. 1979). See SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1334
n.29 (5th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Koracorp Indus., Inc., 575 F.2d 692, 698-99 (9th Cir. 1978); SEC
v. Bangor Punta Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'dsub nom. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973);
SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100-02 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Keller,
Corp., 323 F.2d 397, 402-03 (7th Cir. 1963); SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241, 249-50 (2d Cir.
1959).
162. 100 S. Ct. at 1947. See cases cited in note 161 supra.
163. See SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 53-56 (2d Cir. 1976) (injunction denied
after balancing the needs against the hardships imposed). Cf. Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC,
[1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,854, at 95,483 n.21 (2d Cir. May 10,
1979) (action to enjoin SEC proceeding; question of liability of entire firm for conduct of a
few individual members must await the conclusion of the administrative process because it
was unclear whether SEC discipline was forthcoming and issue not raised before the Commission or the appeals court); SEC v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d 1149, 1170-71 nn, 48 & 49
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (case remanded to resolve questions under § 20(a) of the Exchange Act);
Rolfv. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38,48 & nn. 17-19 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,439
U.S. 1039 (1978) (private fraud action; on appeal the firm conceded liability if employee
found liable); SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 701 n.42 (D.D.C.
1978) (mem.) (question avoided because firm did not challenge SEC on appeal). See also
Securities Act of 1933, § 15, 15 U.S.C. 77o (1976) (lack of knowledge or reasonable ground
to believe is a defense for a person who "controls" another who is liable); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1976) (good faith is a defense).
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professions, where reputation and image are of great importance,
the
64
stigma of an injunction can have severe negative consequences
Injunctions are designed to deter future violations, not to punish.
As such, the potential hardship on a firm occasioned by an injunction
should be balanced against the need to restrain action. Courts should
exercise caution and restraint when this issue arises. At the same time,
however, courts should also recognize that when the private interest
conflicts with the public interest, the latter may be considered paramount.' 6 5
2.

Ancillary or other equitable relief

Section 20(b) 16 6 of the Securities Act and section 21(d) 167 of the
Exchange Act authorize the SEC to seek injunctive relief in federal
court to halt existing or threatened violations. Relying, however, on
their broad equitable powers, 68 the federal courts have granted various
164. See SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 55 (2d Cir. 1976). In SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978), Judge Friendly stated:
It is fair to say that the current judicial attitude toward the issuance of injunctions on the basis of past violations at the SEC's request has become more circumspect than in the earlier days. Experience has shown that an injunction, while not
always a "drastic remedy" . . . often is much more than [a] "mild prophylactic"....
Id. at 99 (citations omitted).
Section 15 of the Securities Act and section 20 of the Exchange Act impose liability on
persons who control the violator, but these statutes expressly require a showing of willfulness on the part of the controlling persons before such liability may be imposed. In addition,
liability may be imposed on a firm based on a respondeatsuperiortheory, but such liability
does not necessarily follow a showing of violations by a member of the firm. See cases cited
in note 163 supra. See also SEC v. Lum's Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1061-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(rejecting respondeatsuperiortheory). Cf. Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1051-53
(7th Cir. 1974) (liability imposed on brokerage firm for churning); Lewis v. Walston & Co.,
487 F.2d 617, 623-24 (5th Cir. 1973) (liability imposed on brokerage firm for sale of unregistered stock).
165. SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241, 250 (2d Cir. 1959). Accord, SEC v. Advance
Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40, 53 (7th Cir. 1972); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc.,
458 F.2d 1082, 1102 (2d Cir. 1972). It bears mentioning that the considerations applicable in
determining the liability of a firm for the conduct of members of the firm may differ when
the liability sought to be imposed is for damages rather than an injunction. For example, in
a case seeking contract damages, traditional agency principles are applicable to a determination of an accounting firm's liability for the conduct of one of its partners. See In re F.W.
Koenecke & Sons, Inc., 605 F.2d 310, 312-13 (7th Cir. 1979).
166. 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1976).
167. 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1976).
168. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the federal courts have broad equitable
powers under the Securities Acts to fashion such relief as is necessary under the circumstances. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); J. I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940).
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forms of far-reaching ancillary or other equitable temedies. 69
On several occasions the Supreme Court has affirmed the principle
that the securities acts grant the federal courts broad equitable powers
to fashion such relief as is considered necessary.17 0 Although none of
the Supreme Court cases has involved suit by the SEC, the guidance
taken from these decisions has led lower courts to grant a variety of
ancillary remedies in SEC actions. '17 For example, these remedies
have included appointment of receivers,'172 appointment of new directors, 173 appointment of independent professionals to monitor the conduct of companies, 74 rescission, disgorgement, restitution and various
75
other remedies.'

Generally, most of the cases involving ancillary or other equitable
relief have been consent cases. Rather than taking the time and expense of litigation against the SEC and risking the potential hazards of
an adverse decision, 76 defendants frequently have been willing to settle claims by the SEC through the negotiated consent process. 177 A
negotiated consent will usually include an injunction and may include
169. See generally Farrand, supra note 146, passim.
170. See cases cited in note 168 supra.
171. See notes 172-75 infra and accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., SEC v. United States Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973);
SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1970); Lankenau v. Coggeshall &
Hicks, 350 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1965). See Farrand, supra note 146, at 1784-89.
173. See, e.g., SEC v. International Controls Corp., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 5643, [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,210 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 1973); SEC v. Equity
Funding Corp., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 5849, [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
93,955 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1973); SEC v. Mattel, Inc., SEC Lit. Re]. No. 6531, [1974-1975
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 94,807 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 1974). See Farrand,
supra note 146, at 1796.
174. See, e.g., International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 932 (1974); SEC v. Mattel, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 6531, [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REr. (CCH) 1 94,807 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 1974). See Farrand, supra note
146, at 1793-94.
175. See Farrand, supra note 146, at 1800-05.
176. The risks attendant to an adverse decision in litigation against the SEC were significantly heightened by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co.,
439 U.S. 322 (1979). In ParklaneHosiery, the Supreme Court held that under some circumstances collateral estoppel may be used offensively against a party who suffers an adverse
decision in a litigated case against the SEC, Thus, an adverse decision in such a case could
trigger subsequent lawsuits by investors and others who conceivably could use the adverse
decision in the SEC suit offensively by asserting collateral estoppel. See generally Note,
Mutuality ofEstoppeland the Seventh Amendment: The Effect ofParklaneHosiery, 64 CoRNELL L. REv. 1002 (1979).
177. See Levine & Herlihy, How SEC Will Continue to Use ConsentDecrees, Legal Times
Wash., June 5, 1978, at 16, col. 2; Mathews, Recent Trends in SEC Requestsfor Ancillary
Relie/in SEC Civil Injunctive Actions, 31 Bus. LAW. 1323 (1976).
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various forms of ancillary relief. 7 ' It should be stressed, however, that
in a number of cases the SEC has obtained such ancillary relief through

litigation. 179
In recent years, the SEC has obtained a variety of ancillary remedies against accountants and accounting firms. The first major inroad
in this area was in SEC v. Everest Management Corp.,'10 wherein a
major accounting firm agreed to adopt internal supervisory and control
procedures with respect to its audit practice. The firm also consented to
a "peer review" of its professional practice by independent third persons. These elements of ancillary relief were incorporated into a consent injunction entered into by the accounting firm. In a simultaneous
administrative proceeding brought by the SEC, the firm consented to
certain prohibitions against taking on new business which required
filing reports with the SEC.'
Similarly, in SEC v. Republic National Life Insurance Co.," s2 an
accounting firm consented to an injunction which required the firm to
adopt certain audit procedures relating to future audits of its clients
and to retain a special consultant to review the firm's audits of a designated percentage of its clients. More importantly, the injunction
against the firm extended to the firm's audits of other clients that had
substantial transactions similar in character to those that gave rise to
the suit against the firm.
In another consent action, an accounting firm agreed to implement
new audit procedures, to conduct a "peer review" and to refrain from
accepting new business requiring filings with the SEC for a designated
period of time.' 3 In addition, an individual member of the firm was
178. See generally I MATHEWS, NEGOTIATING SEC CONSENT DECREES: TARGETS &
TACTICS FOR SETTLING CIVIL INJUNCTIVE ACTIONS (1979).

179. Eg., SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 103 n.13 (2d Cir. 1978)
(disgorgement); SEC v. Aydin Corp., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,111 (D.D.C.
Oct. 25, 1979) (independent auditors); SEC v. The Fundpack, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,951 (D.D.C. Aug. 10, 1979) (special master to supervise election of new board).
180. SEC Lit. Rel. No. 5209 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1971). See Olson, SEC Proceedings
Against Accountants, I NEGOTIATING SEC CONSENT DECREES" TARGETS & TACTICS FOR
SETTLING CIVIL INJUNCTIVE ACTIONS 496 (1979) [hereinafter cited as ProceedingsAgainst
Accountants].
181. See authorities cited in note 180 supra.
182. SEC Lit. Rel. No. 6273, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
94,426 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 1974); ProceedingsAgainstAccountants,supra note 180, at 496-97.
183. SEC v. Allegheny Beverage Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
94,183 (D.D.C. 1973); Exre Benjamin Botwinick & Co., SEC Accounting Series Release
[hereinafter referred to as ASR] No. 168 (Jan. 13, 1975), 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
72,190; ProceedingsAgainst Accountants, supra note 180, at 497-98.
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required to attend continuing education classes for a fixed number of
hours, was prohibited from practicing before the SEC without supervision and was prohibited from acting as or being a partner of the firm
for a designated period of time. The firm also was required to implement a policy whereby its partners would attend continuing education
courses for a minimum number of hours over a period of time.
In 1975, one of the major accounting firms in the United States
consented to injunctions and various forms of ancillary relief in four
separate SEC suits.' 84 The firm agreed to implement various internal
procedures with respect to new audit clients and to new engagements
following the resignation by a predecessor auditor. It also consented to
a "second partner" review of reports prior to their issuance and agreed
to study certain accounting principles and implement audit procedures.
The firm also agreed to institute a "peer review" program and to refrain from accepting new SEC clients for a period of six months.
In addition to obtaining ancillary relief against individual accountants and accounting firms in civil injunctive suits, the SEC has
obtained such relief in its administrative proceedings, in which it has
meted out a variety of disciplinary sanctions. 8 ' The Commission's imposition of sanctions in its administrative proceedings, including cases
where professionals have been barred or suspended from appearing or
practicing before the Commission, has been undertaken without any
finding that the alleged misconduct is likely to reoccur, as in some state
bar disciplinary proceedings.' 86
D.

Administrative Proceedings

Under rule 2(e) of its Rules of Practice,' 87 the Commission may
deny any person the privilege of appearing or practicing before it if
such person is found:
(1) not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent
others, or (2) to be lacking in character or integrity or to have
engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct, or (3)
184. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., ASR No. 173 (July 2, 1975), 6 FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 72,195; ProceedingsAgainstAccountants, supra note 180, at 498. In another suit, a
Big Eight firm consented to review its internal procedures relating to matters such as those
raised in the SEC's complaint. The firm agreed to adopt such new procedures as it deemed
advisable as a result of that review. The firm also agreed to a "peer review" and a refund of
$120,000 in audit fees relating to the audits for the years in question. In re Price Waterhouse
& Co. Lit., 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCII) 9172,260 (Jan. 16, 1978); Proceedings.AgainstAccountants, supra note 180, at 499.
185. See note 191 infra.

186. See, e.g., State v. Rogers, 226 Wis. 39, 275 N.W. 910 (1937).
187. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1979).
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to have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted a violation of any provision of the federal securities law. . . or the
rules and regulations thereunder. 88
"Practicing before the Commission" is defined to include "the preparation of any statement, opinion or other paper by an attorney, accountant, engineer or other expert, filed with the Commission... with
the
189
expert."
other
or
engineer
accountant,
attorney,
such
of
consent
In recent years, the SEC has imposed a variety of sanctions on
professionals, 190 including accountants and accounting firms, 91 under
188. Id. § 201.2(e)(1).
189. Id. § 201.2(g). The definition of practice before the Commission also includes
"transacting any business with the Commission." Id.
190. An area which has attracted a great deal of attention is the Commission's disciplinary proceedings against lawyers. See Gruenbaum, Clients'FraudsandTheirLawyers' Obligations: A Response to ProfessorKramer,68 GEo. L.. 191, 200-04 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Gruenbaum, A Response]; Gruenbaum, Corporate/SecuritiesLawyers: Disclosure,Responsibility, and Liability to Investors, and National Student Marketing Corp., 54 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 795 (1979).
191. See, e.g., In re Darrel L. Nielsen, ASR No. 275 (1980), 6 FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) 1
72,297, at 62,780 (temporary suspension of accountant enjoined from violations of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws made permanent); In re Touche Ross & Co.,
ASR No. 153A (1979), 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) I 72,175A, at 62,363 (censure of firm;
firm agreed to institute a "peer review" and to implement recommendations resulting therefrom; firm agreed that the working papers, files and other documentation of the examination
would be available to the Commission); In re Ernst & Ernst, ASR No. 248 (1978), 6 FED.
SEC. L. REp. (CCH) $ 72,270, at 62,734 (censure of firm; suspension of one firm partner for
one year and another firm partner for three months from appearing or practicing before the
Commission); In re LaLande, ASR No. 229 (1977), 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 72,251, at
62,641 (three partners of firm suspended from appearing or practicing before the Commission for six months; each partner also undertook to notify the Commission's Office of the
Chief Accountant prior to appearing or practicing before the Commission in the future); In
re Thomas Leger & Co., ASR No. 223 (1977), 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 9 72,245, at 62,605
(firm submitted to review of its policies, practices and procedures by unrelated reviewer and
agreed to implement his recommendations; firm and one partner agreed not to engage any
new public clients for period ending thirty days after completion of final report by reviewer,
reviewer's working papers, files and other documentation would be available to the Commission); In re Reich, Weiner & Co., ASR No. 210 (1977), 6 FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) 1
72,232, at 62,588-89 (firm agreed to participate in AICPA's program of voluntary quality
control review for firms with general audit practices for period of three years; firm agreed to
implement new procedures and to submit review report to the Commission; firm agreed to
suspend efforts to obtain and to refuse new professional engagements which would involve
practicing before the Commission for a period of twenty days); In re S. D. Leidesdorf & Co.,
ASR No. 209 (1977), 6 FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) 1 72,231, at 62,579-84 (firm agreed to
institute "peer review" and to implement recommendations resulting from that review; firm
agreed that working papers, fies and documents of review committee would be made available to the Commission; firm agreed, with certain exceptions, not to accept or negotiate new
SEC audit engagements for period of sixty days; and two firm members agreed to severely
limit their audit practice involving filings with or practice before the Commission for periods
of nine and seven months, respectively); In re Seidman & Seidman, ASR No. 196 (1976), 6
FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) %72,218, at 62,543-56 (firm agreed to conduct "peer review" and
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rule 2(e). The Commission's use of power under rule 2(e) has been
criticized both from within and without the Commission. The criticism, generally, has been that the Commission overuses and abuses its
power under the rule. While on the Commission, one former SEC

Commissioner who opposed broad use of the rule, argued that disciplinary proceedings against professionals should be limited to cases in
which the conduct of the professional interferes with the administrative

processes of the SEC. 192 One commentator has criticized the SEC's imposition of sanctions under rule 2(e) as an "inordinate intrusion of govhave
ernment into professional activity."' 193 Other commentators 1 94
argued that the SEC's rule 2(e) proceedings violate due process.

Despite these criticisms, the SEC's authority under rule 2(e) has
to implement recommendations resulting therefrom; firm agreed that working papers, files
and documents of review committee would be available to the Commission; firm undertook,
with certain exceptions, not to accept new SEC audit engagements for period of three and
one-half months; and four members of the firm undertook not to perform any SEC audit
work for periods ranging from two months to six months); In re Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &
Co., ASR No. 173 (1975), 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) %72,195, at 62,455-57 (firm agreed to
conduct "peer review" and to implement recommendations resulting therefrom; firm agreed
that working papers, files and documents of review committee would be made available to
the Commission; firm agreed not to negotiate for or accept new SEC audit engagements for
period of six months; firm agreed to entry of final judgment of permanent injunction in each
of four civil injunctive suits brought by the Commission against the firm; and firm agreed to
revise and implement certain procedures relating to its second partner review procedure); In
re Benjamin Botwinick & Co., ASR No. 168 (1975), 6 FED. SEC.L. RaP. (CCH) 172,190, at
62,406 (firm and one partner consented to final judgments of permanent injunction against
violations of certain provisions of the federal securities laws; firm consented to "peer review"
and to implement recommendations resulting therefrom; partner agreed to attend continuing professional education courses or seminars for at least 100 hours during a ten-month
period in subjects relating to public accounting or auditing; partner agreed not to practice
before the Commission for ten months and not to act as or be a partner in the firm for ten
months; and firm agreed to resign audit engagement of client with respect to which the
Commission's proceeding related). See also In re Haskins & Sells, ASR No. 241 (1978), 6
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,263, at 62,695-97; In re Rudolph, Palitz & Co., ASR No. 191
(1976), 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 72,213, at 62,511-12; In re Hertz, Herson & Co., ASR
No. 176 (1975), 6 FED. SaC. L. REP. (CCH) 172,198, at 62,471-72; In re Harris, Kerr, Forster
& Co., ASR No. 174 (1975), 6 FED SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) 1 72,196, at 62,468; In re vestheimer, Fine, Berger & Co., ASR No. 167 (1974), 6 FED. SEc. L. Rap. (CCH) 1 72,189, at
62,404; In re Loux, Gose & Co., ASR No. 160 (1974), 6 FED. SEC.L. REp. (CCH) 172,182,
at 62,380-81; In re Arthur Andersen & Co., ASR No. 157 (1974), 6 FED. SEC.L. RaP. (CCH)
72,179, at 62,374-75; In re Touche Ross & Co., ASR No. 153 (1974), 6 FED. SEC. L. RaP.
(CCH) %72,175, at 62,361-62; In re Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, ASR No.
144 (1973), 5 FED. SEC.L. Rap. (CCII) 172,166, at 62,329-30; In re Touche, Niven, Bailey &
Smart, ASR No. 78 (1957), 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 72,100, at 62,223.
192. In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 9 82,124, at 81,981 (July 2, 1979) (Karmel, Comm'r dissenting).
193. Fiflis, supra note 71, at 63-64. See Downing & Miller, The DistortionandMisuse of
Rule 2(e), 54 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 774 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Downing & Miller].
194. Downing & Miller, supra note 193, at 782-86.
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been upheld by the Second Circuit in Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC. 195

Initially, the SEC instituted public administrative proceedings against
Touche Ross & Co., a national accounting firm, under rule 2(e). 196 The
firm challenged the Commission's 2(e) authority in federal district
court. In affirming the district court's decision, the Second Circuit in
Touche Ross agreed that the Commission has the authority to discipline professionals under the rule, observing that there is no express

statutory prohibition against the promulgation of rule 2(e) in the federal securities laws. Furthermore, the Touche Ross court believed the
Commission's utilization of the rule is a proper attempt to preserve the

integrity of the Commission's procedures by assuring the fitness of
those professionals who represent others before the Commission and to
determine whether a professional's qualifications, including his character and integrity, are such that he is fit to appear and practice before the
Commission. Moreover, the rule is consistent with the Commission's
statutory authority under the federal securities laws.' 9 7
195. 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979). The district court in Touche Ross was careful to point
out that its decision against the accounting firm was based on the firm's failure to exhaust its
administrative remedies and the court therefore did not reach "the substantive question ot
the validity of Rule 2(e)." Id. at 574.
196. In re Touche Ross & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
80,720 (1976).
197. 609 F.2d at 581-82.
The court in Touche Ross went out of its way to raise the issue of whether the Commission could hold an entire accounting firm vicariously liable under Rule 2(e) for the alleged
misconduct of only some of its partners:
Touche Ross chose to remain loyal to its retired partners [the alleged wrongdoers]
and to challenge Rule 2(e) in a broadside attack on the right of the Commission to
discipline anyone. Our opinion today rejects this sally. Nothing in the complaint,
or the district court proceedings, or the briefs and oral argument before us purports
to raise the question of the extent to which the Commission has the power, in a
disciplinary action, to hold Touche Ross and its 525 partners vicariously liable to
the extent of permanent revocation of the right to practice for the acts of its erstwhile partners. It may be argued, for example, that the Commission may not proceed against Touche Ross on a theory of respondeat superior without first
establishing that Congress has delegated such authority and that the Commission
has, through a rulemaking proceeding, set standards for such an adjudication, including a definition of "willful conduct...." We express no view on this question, but it is one that the Commission might want to consider. In any event, since
it is far from clear that the Commission will in fact determine to discipline Touche
Ross, and since the question was not raised before the Commission or this court,
the resolution of such issues should await the conclusion of the administrative
process.
609 F.2d at 582 n.21 (citation omitted). See Fuller, The FornsandLimis of4djudication,92
HARV. L. REV. 353, 373 (1978).
The court's statements in Touche Ross raise due process issues with respect to the Commission's authority and ability to hold an entire firm responsible for the unlawful conduct of
one or a few of its members. See Downing & Miller, supranote 193, at 782-86. The Commission's position on this issue appears to be as follows: "[W]e have consistently held that
where ... a firm of public accountants permits a report or certificate to be executed in its
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The courts have not decided whether the proper standard of proof
in rule 2(e) proceedings against accountants should be a "preponder-

ance of the evidence" or a "clear and convincing" standard. Traditionally, the SEC has applied the "preponderance of the evidence"
standard in its administrative proceedings. In Collins Securities Corp. v.
SEC,98 however, which involved the revocation of broker-dealer and

investment advisor registrations, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit rejected this longstanding administrative prac19 9
tice.
The court in Collins emphasized that when fraud allegations are
the subject of a disciplinary proceeding, and, more importantly, when
the sanction sought to be imposed is the disbarment of a professional

from practice, a "clear and convincing" rather
than a "preponderance
2 °°
of the evidence" standard should be used.

The underlying rationale

for this decision was that a finding of fraud and the concomitant disbarment from practice constituted a severe deprivation to the respon-

dent and was more than mere prophylactic relief. Therefore, a higher
21
degree of proof was required. '

The District of Columbia Circuit in Whitney v. SEC20 2 extended

the Collins rationale to encompass a nine-month suspension of a broker-dealer based on allegations of fraud. 20 3 The Fifth Circuit, however, in Steadman v. SEC,2° rejected Collins, reasoning that the
preponderance standard, in a case involving fraud allegations and per-

manent disbarment from association with any investment advisor, was
appropriate in light of the Commission's interest in adequately policing

the securities industry to protect the investing public.2"' Thus, the deciname, it will be held responsible therefor." In re Ernst & Ernst, ASR No. 248 (1978), 6 FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,270, at 62,733 (footnotes omitted). See In re Touche Ross & Co.,
ASR No. 153 (1974), 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,175; In re Touche, Niven, Bailey &
Smart, ASR No. 78 (1957), 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,100.
198. 562 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
199. Id. at 825-26.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. 604 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
203. The court stated: "Like the revocation in Collins, a suspension for nine months imposes a serious loss, both as a short-run matter of foregone business and, perhaps more
grieviously, as a permanent injury to reputation." Id. at 681.
204. 603 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S.Ct. 1849 (1980).
205. The Steadman court stated:
The burden of proof serves to allocate between the litigants the risk of erroneous
decision in a proceeding. Balanced against the risk to Steadman is the risk that the
investing public will be inadequately protected. The public interest in high standards of conduct in the securities business is a great one. If the burden of proof
imposed on the Commission is too high, its ability to police the industry is im-
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sions on the issue of the proper standard of proof are irreconcilable. In
an effort to resolve this conflict, the Supreme Court has granted certiorariin Steadman, °6 and thus, will be the final arbiter. °7
paired. . . . We subscribe to the common-sense notion that the greater the sanction the Commission decides to impose, the greater is its burden of justification.
Where, as here, the most potent weapon in the Commission's "arsenal of flexible
enforcement powers" is used, the Commission has an obligation to explain why a
less drastic remedy would not suffice.
ld.at 1139 (citations omitted). See also Schultz v. SEC, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
T 97,234 (7th Cir. Jan. 7, 1980), in which the Seventh Circuit expressly left the standard of
proof issue open:
This court has never held and does not hold today that a clear and convincing
standard of proof is required in proceedings like the one at bar. In Collins Securities Corp. v. S.E.C, 562 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cited by petitioner, wherein a
clear and convincing standard was used, the violation alleged involved fraud and
the penalty was disbarment. In Whitney v. SE. C., 604 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1979), a
violation of the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act was found
and the clear and convincing standard of proof was used. However, at least one
court has explicitly refused to follow Colllins and did not use the clear and convincing standard in a case which also involved fraud. Steadman v. SEC., [602
F.2d 1126, cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1849 (1980)]. The issue of what standard we
would use in a case involving fraud is not before us.
Id. at 96,687 n.17. See Decker v. SEC,.[Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,614 (10th
Cir. Aug. 18, 1980) (civil charge of aiding and abetting violation of section 17(e)(1) of Investment Co. Act requires preponderance of the evidence standard); Investors Research Corp. v.
SEC, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,526 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 24, 1980) (clear and
convincing standard held not applicable in SEC administrative action based on violations of
section 17(e)(1) of the Investment Company Act wherein finding of fraud was not required
and no severe sanction was imposed). See also Charlton v. FTC, 543 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir.
1976), which involved the issue of whether the FTC used the proper standard of proof in
imposing upon an attorney a one-year suspension of practice before the Commission. The
standard utilized by the FTC, which the court rejected, was that of "substantial evidence"
which the Commission defined as "not 'the preponderance of the evidence,' but 'something
less than the weight of the evidence,' [constituting] 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."' Id. at 907.
The Charlton court rejected the "substantial evidence" standard:
Disciplinary proceedings against attorneys do not involve any departure from the
orthodox rule governing resolution of civil evidentiary contents. Almost seventy
years ago, this court declared that the "charge should be supported by a preponderance of satisfactory evidence. The case should be clear and free from doubt." The
same view, though variously articulated is the touchstone of judicial decisions
across the Nation; the bare minimum for a finding of misconduct is the greater
convincing power of the evidence. That the proceeding is administrative rather
than judicial does not diminish this wholesome demand, and the requirement
should not have been relaxed in the case at bar ....
We reverse the District
Court's summary judgment against Charlton and remand the case for further proceedings. The District Court will vacate the Commission's disciplinary order and
will, in turn, remand to the Commission with instruction that it reconsider the
evidence and redetermine the charge by application of the preponderance-of-theevidence rule.
Id. at 907-08 (emphasis added).
206. 603 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1849 (1980).
207. It is no doubt true that administrative or civil injunctive proceedings against professionals such as accountants and lawyers can have a harsher impact than similar proceedings
against persons of different occupations. See SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457
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Finally, the Commission has rejected the Hochfelder scienter requirement in its rule 2(e) proceedings, defining "willfully" as meaning

the intentional commission of the act which constitutes the violations.2 °8 The argument supporting the Commission's position is that its

administrative proceedings are prophylactic in character, designed to
protect investors, and it therefore should not be burdened with the

more difficult standard established by Hochfelder.20 9 This policy rationale is similar to that applied by those courts holding that the Commission need not prove scienter in civil injunctive suits.2 10 By arguably
not requiring evil motive, recklessness or even gross negligence, the
question arises whether the Commission's interpretation of the term
"willfulness" runs afoul of Aaron,2 ' particularly in view of the literal
linguistic analysis2 1 2 employed there. The answer to this question, like
F. Supp. 682, 701 n.43 (D.D.C. 1978); Mathews, Liability ofLawyers Under the FederalSecurities Laws, 30 Bus. LAW. 105, 106 (1975) (special issue). See notes 171-74 supra and
accompanying text. However, as one court put it: "[T]he incremental effect does not seem
sufficient to justify the extraordinary step of requiring a higher standard of proof against
lawyers [and presumably accountants] than that which would be applicable to others." SEC
v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. at 701 n.43.
208. Thus the Commission has consistently taken the position that the culpability requirement set forth in Tager v. SEC, 344 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965), should be applied in its
administative proceedings. In Tager, the Second Circuit stated that "'willfully'. . . means
intentionally committing the act which constitutes the violation." Id. at 8. In Arthur Lipper
Corp. v. SEC, 547 F.2d 171, 180 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978), the Second Circuit noted that the SEC has consistently held that "willfully" in the context of section
15 of the Exchange Act only requires proof that the defendant was aware of what he was
doing.
This standard of culpability was recently applied in a rule 2(e) administrative proceeding against two lawyers. See In re Carter & Johnson, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 82,175 (Mar. 7, 1979). See Gruenbaum, 4 Response, supra note 190, at 203
n.65 for a discussion of the conflict between SEC's recognition of the Tager test to determine
"fraud" and the American Bar Association's interpretation of "fraud" in the Code of Professional Responsiblity which requires an intention to deceive.
209. See cases cited in note 208 supra.
210. See notes 137-45 supra and accompanying text.
211. See notes 101 & 144-45 supra and accompanying text. But see Arthur Lipper v.
SEC, 547 F.2d 171, 180-81 n.6 (2d Cir. 1976). See also 566 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) AA5 (Aug. 13, 1980).
212. In Aaron v. SEC, 100 S.Ct. 1953 (1980), the Court refused to construe section 10(b)
differently than it had in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), on the basis that
the SEC, as opposed to a private litigant, was the plaintiff in the case and the suit was for
injunctive relief as opposed to damages. 100 S.Ct. at 1953. Instead, the Court concluded
that its holding in Hochfelderthat scienter is required in private damage actions under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act was based on a literal reading of the statute, and this literal
reading must control irrespective of the identity of the plaintiff and the fact that injunctive
relief rather than monetary damages is the remedy sought. Id. at 1954. In light of Aaron,
there is an issue whether a different construction of section 10(b) in SEC administrative
proceedings could withstand analysis. See also Decker v. SEC, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 97,614 (10th Cir. Aug. 18, 1980) (Tager standard applies only to principals; for
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the state of mind and standard of proof issues, may be left to Supreme

Court resolution.
E.

The Foreign CorruptPracticesAct of 1977

In 1977, Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA).z 13 The impetus for passage of the Act was the scandals that

emerged regarding questionable and illegal payments by United States
companies, both domestically and abroad. 2 14
The FCPA imposes book-keeping and internal accounting control

responsibilities on public companies,"1 5 prohibits the payment of bribes
by public and nonpublic companies,2 16 and imposes both civil liability

and criminal penalties for violations of its requirements and proscriptions.2 17 Virtually no case law has developed regarding the FCPA's
recent enactments,2 1 8 but commentators have begun to explore the
aider and abettor liability, scienter must be shown); 566 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) AA-5
(Aug. 13, 1980).
213. Title I of Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (Dec. 1977) (amending § 13(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (Supp. 1979)).
214. See generally Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct of 1977 andthe Regulation of Questionable Payments, 34 Bus. LAW. 623 (1979); Committee on Corporate Law and Accounting, A
Guide to the New Section 13(b)(2) Accounting Requirements of the SecuritiesExchange Act of
1934, 34 Bus. LAW. 307 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Guide to New Section 13(b)(2)].
215. Section 13(b)(2) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(b)(2) (Supp. 1979).
216. Section 103 of the FCPA amends section 30 of the Exchange Act by adding a new
section 30A, which prohibits public companies and persons acting on their behalf from bribing foreign government officials to obtain or retain business or to direct business to any other
person.
Section 104 of the FCPA imposes similar prohibitions on certain individuals and on
non-public domestic business entities and foreign business entities having a principal place
of business in the United States. See Impact ofthe Antibribery Prohibitionsin Section 304 of
the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16593 (Feb. 21,
1980), [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,454.
Enforcement of the FCPA is divided between the SEC as to public companies and the
Department of Justice as to all others. See generally Timmeny, SEC Enforcement of the
Foreign CorruptPracticesAct, 2 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. ANN. 25, 26-27 (1979) [hereinqfter cited as Timmeny].
217. See notes 223-25 infra and accompanying text.
218. The Commission has instituted a number of injunctive suits to enforce the provisions
of the FCPA. See, e.g., SEC v. Sfisco, SEC Lit. Rel. 8483, 15 SEC DOCKET 536 (1978); SEC
v. Katy Indus., Inc., 15 SEC DOCKET 891 (N.D. 11l. 1978); SEC v. Page Airways, [1978
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,393 (D.D.C. 1978), settled, [Current] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,341 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 1980); SEC v. Aminex, Res. Corp., [1978
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,352 (D.D.C. 1978); Timmeny, supra note
216, at 38-39. Cf. SEC v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 96,464 (E.D. Wis. 1978). Recently, Playboy Enterprises, Inc. consented to the
first section 15(c)(4) administrative proceeding brought by the SEC to enforce the accounting control requirements of the FCPA. In re Playboy Enterp., Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 82,635 (Aug. 13, 1980).
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Act's many implications.2" 9
The most significant aspect of the FCPA that affects accountants is
the amending of section 13 of the Exchange Act to add new section
13(b)(2). Subsection (A) of section 13(b)(2) requires publicly-held
companies to "make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in
reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the[ir] assets."2 2 Subsection (B) of section 13(b)(2) requires every publicly-held company to "devise and maintain a system
of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that" transactions are executed in accordance with management's
authorization and recorded in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, and that access to and accountability for assets are
221
adequately controlled.
The express language of section 13(b)(2) clearly places the onus of
compliance on the public company rather than on the accountant.
However, because the mandated "books and records" and "internal accounting control" provisions of the FCPA involve matters within the
technical expertise of accountants, companies subject to the Act are
likely to engage and rely upon their accountants to develop and review

adequate internal compliance systems.222 This no doubt foreshadows
charges against accountants when the companies themselves are

charged with violating the requirements of section 13(b)(2).
Under section 2 1(d) of the Exchange Act, the SEC is authorized to

bring civil injunctive suits for violations of any of the provisions of that
219. See note 214 supra;,Timmeny, supra note 216; Baruch, Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 57 HARv. Bus. REv.32 (1979); Atkinson, The Foreign CorruptPracticesAct of1977: An
InternationalApplicationof SEC's CorporateGovernanceReforms, 12 INT'L LAW. 703 (1978);
Best, The ForeignCorruptPracticesAct, 11 REV.SEC. REG. 975 (1978); AccountingProvisions
of Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct Discussed at New York Law Journal Seminar, 451 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) D-1, D-2 (May 3, 1978); Olson, InternalAccounting ControlMandatedby the FCPA of 1977, 372 N.Y.L.J. 26 (1978).
220. For a discussion of the requirements of section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act, see
Guide to the New Section 13(b)(2), supra note 214, at 313-16.
221. For a discussion of the requirements of section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act, see
id. at 316-20.
222. Id.at 323-24. Established standards in the accounting profession already require an
auditor to disclose any material weaknesses in internal accounting control to management.
Required Communication of Material Weaknesses in InternalAccounting Control, AICPA
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 20. In addition, an auditor is required to disclose to
management any errors or irregularities which he believes may exist. The.IndependentAudi.
tor'sResponsibilityforthe Detection ofErrorsandIrregularities,AICPA Statement on Auditing Standards No. 16. Thus, to some degree auditors already are required to bring
information to the attention of their clients which will facilitate compliance with section
13(b)(2).
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Act.223 Therefore, such suits against accountants for violations of section 13(b)(2) could clearly follow. As compliance with the Act is primarily the responsibility of the subject companies, suits against
accountants will probably be based on aider and abettor liability. In
addition, the Commission may institute administrative proceedings for
violations of section 13(b)(2). Further, rule 2(e) may be invoked as a
means of disciplining accountants for alleged violations of the section.224 Finally, violations of section 13(b)(2) may be prosecuted
criminally vis-a-vis section 32 of the Exchange Act, and presumably,

criminal charges could be leveled against accountants for aiding and
abetting violations of section 13(b)(2).22 5
The express langauge of the FCPA makes no mention of private

rights of action for violations of any of its provisions. Thus, if such an
action exists, it must be implied, 226 although the legislative history of

the Act is not entirely clear on this question.227 Such silence or ambi-

guity, however, does not preclude the implication of a private right of
action.22 8 While the Supreme Court has been reluctant to imply private rights of action in recent years, 229 both that Court and the lower
courts have implied such actions in the past under various provisions of
the Exchange Act where the statutes themselves and the legislative history have been silent on the issue,23 ° and they may do so again. The
223. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d) (Supp. 1979). As discussed earlier, the courts have been willing to use their broad equitable powers to grant various forms of ancillary or other equitable
relief in addition to issuing injunctions against violations of the federal securities laws. See
notes 165-86 supra and accompanying text.
224. "The Commission, of course, will retain all of its existing remedies under the securities laws, and the committee anticipates that the Commission will continue to tailor remedies
to fit the circumstances. . . ." S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1977). See Timmeny, supra note 216, at 40-42 for a discussion of administrative proceedings under section
15(c)(4) of the Exchange Act for violations of the FCPA.
225. Section 32(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1976), provides that any person
who willfully violates any provision of the Exchange Act "shall upon conviction be fined not
more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." For a discussion of
criminal liability under the federal securities laws, see notes 246-324 infra and accompanying text.
226. See generally Steinberg, Implied Rights f Action Under FederalLaw, 55 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 33 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Steinberg, Implied Rights of Action].
227. But see H.R. REP. No. 640,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977) (suggesting that there may
be an implied private right of action).
228. See Steinberg, supranote 97; Steinberg, Implied Rights ofAction, supra note 226, at
47.
229. See Steinberg, Implied Rights ofAction, supra note 226, at 42, 51.
230. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (implied private right of action under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act); J. I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (implied private right of action under section 14(a) of the Exchange Act).

LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13

SEC, moreover, has clearly espoused the view that an implied private

right of action for violations of the FCPA exists.23 1 It can be expected
that if such a private right of action is implied, accountants will be
subject to civil liability, particularly for violations of section 13(b)(2).
One of the more difficult questions the accounting profession faces
as a result of the FCPA is whether all deviations by a subject company

from the requirements of section 13(b)(2) or transgressions of section
30(A), which prohibits "corrupt" payments, constitute violations of the
respective provisions and therefore must be disclosed. Neither section
speaks of materiality, 3 2 and indeed, the legislative history of the FCPA

supports the argument that materiality is not a prerequisite to a violation.1 33 If that were the case, one could argue that the deviation itself,
regardless of its materiality, constitutes a violation of the law and must
be disclosed. Although not a panacea, it may be argued that, particularly under section 13(b)(2), a violation in and of itself is not ipsofacto

material, and therefore disclosure of a violation resulting from an immaterial deviation may not necessarily be required.2 34 Nonetheless, the
absence of a materiality requirement will require greater scrutiny by

accountants of their clients' compliance with the provisions of the
FCPA.2 35
231. Not/fication of Enactment of Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct of 1977, ASR No. 242
(1978), 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1172,264, at 62,701. The Commission apparently has also
adopted the view that a negligence standard will govern civil injunctive suits to enforce the
FCPA. Id. Different culpability requirements for violations may exist under the various
provisions of the FCPA. For example, nothing in the language of section 13(b)(2) suggests
that any form of evil intent is necessary to establish a violation. The section simply imposes
affirmative obligations on public companies as does section 13(a) of the Exchange Act (requiring reports by public companies). Indeed, at least one court has suggested that section
13(a) imposes strict liability and there is not even a need to show negligence to establish a
violation. SEC v. Wills, 472 F. Supp. 1250 (D.D.C. 1978). The same logic could surely
apply to section 13(b)(2). Section 30A of the Exchange Act, which prohibits bribes, may be
another matter altogether. The legislative history of the FCPA apparently indicates that the
term "corruptly" as used in section 30A of the Exchange Act connotes an evil intent or
purpose. Senate Comm on Banking, House and Urban Affairs, Corrupt OverseasPayments
by U.S. Business Enterprises, S. REP. No. 131, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976). If that is the
case, scienter may be required to establish a violation.
232. See Timmeny, supra note 216, at 33-36; Guide to New Section 13(b)(2), supra note
214, at 314-24.
233. H. R. REP. No. 831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977); Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 15570 (1979), [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 81,959, at 81,394.
234. NotIfcation of Enactment of Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct of 1977, ASR No. 242
(1978), 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 172,264, at 62,701 ("Although the legality or illegality of
a particular transaction is one of the factors that must be assessed in determining its materiality, other factors must also be considered."). See Report on QuestionableandIllegalCorporate Payments andPractices,submitted by the SEC to the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs on May 12, 1976, at 16-32.
235. In Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-15570, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
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The FCPA certainly raises several new questions as to the responsibilities and liabilities of accountants. These questions will no doubt
find their way into the courtroom at a future date and will, in all likelihood, result in the tailoring of new duties and responsibilities for accountants.
F

Recent Regulatory Developments and Oversight of the
Accounting Profession

The 1970's ended and the 1980's began with several new and significant regulatory developments that can be expected to have a direct

impact on accountants. For example, as the 1970's came to a close the
Commission adopted new regulation 13B-2, dealing with record-keeping requirements, accountability over assets and financial statement
preparation.2 3 6 The Commission also proposed new rules which, had
they been adopted, would have required a public company's management to give its opinion on the effectiveness of the company's internal
accounting controls, and would also have required the company's in-

dependent
accountants to examine and report on management's opin23 7
ion.

In addition, the Commission adopted new rules dealing with

accountants' liability for filed quarterly financial statements containing
limited review reports.2 38 Finally, the Commission continued its close

oversight
of the accounting profession's ability to adequately regulate
9
23

itself.

L. REP. (CCH) 81,959 (Feb. 15, 1979), the Commission adopted final rules to promote the
reliability of financial information and to prevent the concealment of questionable or illegal
corporate payments and practices. The Release stated that "[i]t bears emphasis ... that the
new requirements [of section 13(b)(2)(A)] are qualified by the phrase 'in reasonable detail'
rather than the concept of 'materiality."' Id. at 81,396. Later in the Release, the Commission stated that "[t]he statute does not require perfection but only that books, records and
accounts 'in reasonabledetail accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions
of the assets of the issuer.'" Id. at 81,398.
236. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15570, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 81,959 (Feb. 15, 1979) (questionable payments rules).
New Rule 13B2-1 provides that no person shall, directly or indirectly, falsify or
cause to be falsified, any book, record or account subject to Section 13(b)(2)(A) of
the Securities Exchange Act. In addition, New Rule 13B2-2 prohibits officers and
directors of an issuer from making materially false, misleading or incomplete statements to an accountant in connection with any audit or examination of the
financial statements of the issuer or the filing of required reports.
Id. (citations omitted).
237. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15772, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH)
82,063 (Apr. 30, 1979). The Commission declined to adopt the proposed
rules.
238. Securities Act Release No. 6173 (Dec. 28, 1979), 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
72,296.
239. Securities and Exchange Commission (Second) Report to Congress on the Accounting
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Each of these developments raises several significant questions

about the responsibility and liability of accountants. For example, the
adoption of regulation 13B-2 may well expand the responsibilities of
accountants by virtue of a perceived need to examine the conformity of

a company's internal systems to the dictates of the regulation. Similarly, the proposed rules dealing with management's statement on in-

ternal accounting controls, if they had been adopted, would have
expanded the responsibilities of accountants to include an examination
of and report on internal accounting controls and management's statement thereon. This would have generated claims of liability when
management's statement was found deficient. 240 In the same vein, the

Commission's adoption of rules designed to exclude accountants from
potential liability for limited review reports on quarterly financial statements may lull accountants into a false sense of security with respect to
these reports. 24 1
Profession andthe Commission's OversightRole, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 82,120 (June 28, 1979); Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on the
Accounting Profession and the Commission's Oversight Role, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,634 (July 1, 1978). For a discsussion of the SEC's third annual
report to Congress, see 569 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) D-I (Sept. 10, 1980).
240. See generally Statement ofManagement on InternalAccountingControl-Comments
on the SEC Rule Proposals(Release No. 34-15772), 35 Bus. LAw. 311 (1979).
241. On September 20, 1979, the SEC published rule proposals for public comment dealing with accountants' liability under section 1 (a) of the Securities Act for reports rendered
on interim financial statements which are included in filed registration statements. Accountant Liabiliyfor Reports on UnauditednterimFinancialInfarmation UnderSecuritiesAct of
1933, Securities Act Release No. 6127 (Sept. 20, 1979), [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 82,308. The Commission expressed the desirability of encouraging the inclusion of such reports in fied registration statements, reasoning that: "the involvement of
independent accountants will add the expertise of professional accountants with wide experience in reporting problems. . . . This should improve individual company reporting and
direct greater professional attention to the general problems of interim reporting."
Id. at 82,334 (citations omitted).
The Commission's Release, however, went on to point out that reluctance on the part of
accountants to issue such reports, based on limited review procedures rather than full-blown
audits, had been expressed because of potential liability under section 1 l(a) of the Securities
Act. Id. at 82,336. See notes 22-40 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of liability
of accountants under section 11. Consequently, the Commission, in an effort to diminish
this reluctance, proposed and adopted rules designed to exclude accountants from section II
liability for such reports.
The method utilized by the Commission was to exclude accountants' reports on interim
financial statements from the definition of "report" as used under section II. See Id. at
82,338-39; Securities Act Release No. 6173 (Dec. 28, 1979), 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
72,296. While the ingenious means utilized by the Commission may well have its intended
effect, there is always the risk that a court may disagree with the Commission's interpretation and conclude that such a report is a "report" within the meaning of section 11. It seems
clear that the interim financial statement report would, except for the Commision's rule,
come within the express language of section 11. Thus, while the Commission may have the
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Commission continues

with its commitment to monitor the ability of the accounting profession
to effectively regulate itself and to achieve the goal of promoting confidence in financial reporting.24 2 In the words of the Commission:

During the past several years, public and Congressional attention has been focused to an unprecedented degree on the ac-

counting profession and on its role in promoting public
confidence in the integrity of financial reporting. The Federal
securities laws, since their enactment in the aftermath of the
economic crisis of the early 1930's, have authorized the Commission to require that independent accountants audit the

financial statements of publicly-held corporations. Thus,
those laws have placed upon the accountant unique and im-

portant responsibilities in facilitating the proper functioning
of this nation's capital formation processes and, more
broadly, of our economic system as a whole. 24 3

The primary focus of the Commission's monitoring of the accounting profession has been in the areas of independence, the encourage-

ment of corporate audit committees, management advisory services,
self-regulation and oversight. 2'

The accounting profession has re-

authority to promulgate the rule, there is always the possibility that a court could take the
position that the Commission's rule goes beyond the language of the statute and therefore it
cannot be interpreted as urged by the Commission. Similar reasoning led the Supreme
Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), to conclude that despite the
language of rule lOb-5, which could be read not to require scienter, the language of section
10(b), which rule lOb-5 was designed to implement, was controlling and required scienter.
In 1980, the Commission published proposed amendments to a rule which would exclude accountants' reports on unaudited supplementary information as to the effects of
changing prices and as to oil and gas reserves from the definition of "report" under sections
7 and I1 of the Securities Act, and thus would have the intended effect of excluding accountants from section 11(a) liability for such reports. Securities Act Release No. 6208 (Apr. 30,
1980), [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,499. See AICPA, Financial Accounting
Standards Board Statement No. 33.
242. Among other things, the Commission attributed the following recent developments
to the heightened attention the accounting profession has received:
Further, the incidence of significant unexpected failures by major corporations and
the disclosure of widespread questionable payments and illegal acts in the 1970's,
among other events, have raised concerns about the integrity and credibility of
financial controls and reporting of publicly-owned companies and, consequently,
the role and responsibility of the accounting profession has come under careful
scrutiny. A broad examination of the nature and structure of the accounting profession has resulted.
Report ofthe Securitiesand Exchange Commission on the Accounting Professionandthe Commission's Oversight Role, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,634, at
80,545 (July 1, 1978).
243. Id.
244. See Securities and Exchange Commission Report to Congresson the Accounting Pro-
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sponded by implementing a host of changes in its self-regulatory
framework and by promulgating new principles and standards in identifed areas of concern. While not entirely satisfied with the profession's progress, as well as some of its conclusions on controversial
subjects, the Commission appears, for the present, to be satisfied with
the strides that have been made.245
II.

CRIMINAL LIABILITY

From a general perspective, the overwhelming number of criminal
suits for violations of the federal securities laws have been brought
under section 24 of the Securities Act246 and section 32(a) of the Exchange Act.24 7 These statutes, however, are not the sole sources of accountant criminal liability under federal law. The Federal Mail Fraud
Statute, 248 the False Statements Section of the Criminal Code,249 the
fession and the Commission's Oversight Role, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 82,120, at 81,954-74 (June 28, 1979); Report of the SecuritiesandExchange Commission on the Accounting Profession and the Commission's Oversight Role, [1978 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 181,634, at 80,545-56 (July 1, 1978).
245. For example, in its concluding remarks to the second report to Congress, the Commission stated:
The Commission believes that progress has been sufficient to merit continued opportunity for the profession to pursue its efforts at self-regulation. Consequently,
the Commission is not recommending, at this time, legislation to supersede or control the regulation of accountants.
[1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 82,120, at 81,973 (June 28, 1979). At
another point in its second report, the Commission stated:
[I]n our report last year, the Commission asked the profession to study two specific
questions-the need for a professional standard mandating independent audit
committees and the scope of auditor management advisory services-which, in the
Commission's view, may impact directly on independence and credibility. In both
cases, although the profession's responses were thorough and timely, its conclusions were disappointing and indicative of the need for further Commission consideration.
Id. at 81,955.
246. 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1976).
247. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1976). See Mathews, CriminalProsecutions Under the Federal
SecuritiesLaws and Related Statutes.- The Nature andDevelopment OSEC CriminalCases,
39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 901, 905 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Mathews]; Note, The Securities
and Exchange Commission: An Introduction to the Enforcement of the CriminalProvisions of
the FederalSecuritiesLaws, 17 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 121, 133-34 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Introduction to the CriminalProvisions].
While the majority of criminal cases have been brought under the Securities Act and
the Exchange Act, the other federal acts which come within the penumbra of the "federal
securities laws" also contain criminal provisions. See Public Utility Holding Company Act
of 1935, § 29, 15 U.S.C. § 79z-3 (1976); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, § 325, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77yyy (1976); Investment Company Act of 1940, § 49, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-48 (1976); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 217, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-17 (1976).
248. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (Supp. 1979).
249. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976).
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offenses of conspiracy,25 ° aiding and abetting,251 criminal contempt for

willful violation of an injunction 252 and willful noncompliance with an
administrative subpoena issued by the SEC253 provide alternative bases
for imposing accountant criminal liability. In addition, the Blue Sky
Laws of every state, many of which have adopted the Uniform Securities Act's provisions on criminal sanctions, authorize the imposition of

fines or imprisonment for willful violations.25 4 Although accountants
can be prosecuted under any of the foregoing provisions, attention has
generally focused on accountant liability under the Securities Act, the
Exchange Act and the Mail Fraud Statute. 255
A.

A GeneralPerspective of CriminalProsecutions

Although a number of provisions under the federal securities laws
256

can be employed to provide a basis for imposing criminal liability,

the ones most frequently utilized are the antifraud prohibitions contained in section 17(a) of the Securities Act and section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act 2 5 7 and the registration provisions of section 5 of the Se-

curities Act.25 However, the foregoing statutory provisions are not in
and of themselves criminal statutes. Instead, section 24 of the Securities Act and section 32 of the Exchange Act generally make willful vio-

lations of any provision, rule or regulation of the respective Acts a
250. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976).
251. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
252. See, e.g., Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969); Williams v. United States, 402
F.2d 47 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675 (4th
Cir. 1967). With respect to the requisite state of mind for a criminal contempt conviction,
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
The appellants already breached the law and had been enjoined not to do so again;
yet they knowingly repeated the selfsame forbidden acts. It is not consonant with
reason, in these circumstances, to demand a more explicit demonstration of an evil
mind in order to sustain the conviction for criminal contempt.
376 F.2d at 682.
253. Each of the Acts that make up the federal securities laws, except for the Securities
Act, contains a provision making willful noncompliance with a subpoena punishable by fine
and/or imprisonment.
254. See H. SOWARDS & N. HIRSCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS-BLUE SKY REGULATION § 9.03 (1979).
255. See, e.g., United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1975), cerl. denied,425 U.S.
934 (1976); United States v. Zane, 495 F.2d 683 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,491 U.S. 895 (1974);
United States v. Bruce, 488 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1973); United
States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,397 U.S. 1006 (1970); Getchell v.
United States, 282 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1960).
256. See note 247 supra.
257. See Introduction to the CriminalProvisions,supra note 247, at 133; Mathews, supra
note 247, at 907.
258. Section 3 of the Securities Act exempts certain types of securities from the application of section 5, and section 4 of the Act exempts certain transactions.
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crime. Hence, criminal violations of the antifraud or registration provisions must be prosecuted under the express authority of sections 24 and
32. Since these two sections are somewhat different, they will be set out
in their entirety. Section 24 of the Securities Act provides:
Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions
of this title, or the rules and regulations promulgated by the
Commission under authority thereof, or any person who willfully, in a registration statement filed under this title, makes
any untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state any
material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to
make the statements therein not misleading, shall upon conviction be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
2 59
more than five years, or both.
Section 32 of the Exchange Act provides:
Any person who willfully violates any provision of this
title (other than section 30A), or any rule or regulation thereunder the violation of which is made unlawful or the observance of which is required under the terms of this title, or any
person who willfully and knowingly makes, or causes to be
made, any statement in any application, report, or document
required to be filed under this title or any rule or regulation
thereunder or any undertaking contained in a registration
statement as provided in subsection (d) of section 15 of this
title or by any self-regulatory organization in connection with
an application for membership or participation therein or to
become associated with a member thereof, which statement
was false or misleading with respect to any material fact, shall
upon conviction be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, except that when such
person is an exchange, a fine not exceeding $500,000 may be
imposed; but no person shall be subject to imprisonment
under this section for the violation of any rule or regulation if
he proves that he had no knowledge of such rule or regulation.2 6 o
Before the criminal provisions may be invoked, some nexus with
the means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce must be
shown. 26 1 This jurisdictional nexus, however, is not difficult to establish. Use of the telephone, the mails, the wire services, the facilities of
259. 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1976).
260. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1976).
261. One need look only so far as the express language of the statutes to discover this
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the national securities exchanges or other means of commerce are commonplace in business transactions. The violation itself need not be

committed by means of the jurisdictional nexus, but some part of the

scheme or course of conduct must touch the jurisdictional means.26 2
Therefore, even mailing annual reports to stockholders or to the SEC
invokes the jurisdiction of the statutes.26 3
Generally, both sections 24 and 32 make a willful violation of any

provision, rule or regulation of the respective Acts a crime. However,
by virtue of the express language of section 32, violation of a rule or

regulation under the Exchange Act is not a crime unless such violation
"is made unlawful" or observance of the rule or regulation is required
under the terms of the Exchange Act. 2 4 Under section 24, presumably

violation of any rule or regulation promulgated by the SEC under the
authority of the Securities Act is criminally punishable.
The most evident inconsistency in the language of sections 24 and
32 is the dual use of the terms "willfully" and "willfully and knowingly." Section 24 employs only the term willfully. Section 32, on the

other hand, employs both terms. The question is therefore, what significance, if any, has been and should be attached to the different terms.
The "willfulness" and "knowledge" requirements have not been
uniformly construed by the courts.2 65 The Second Circuit, in United
States v. Peitz,2 66 construed "willfully" under section 32(a) to signify

that there must exist " 'a realization on the defendant's part that he was
doing a wrongful act'. . . with the qualifications . . . that the act be
wrongful under the securities laws and that the knowingly wrongful act
limitation. See, e.g., sections 5 and 17 of the Securities Act and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.
262. See Mathews, supra note 247, at 920-25. See, e.g., Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522
F.2d 84, 93 n.19 (5th Cir. 1975); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 511 F.2d 641, 642-44 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977); United States v. MacKay, 491 F.2d 616, 629 (10th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied,416 U.S. 972 (1974). See generally5A A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10B-5
§ 37:01, at 2-7 to 2-12 (1974); 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1524 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
263. See, e.g., United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 805 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,397
U.S. 1006 (1970).
264. This distinction has gone unnoticed by commentators. See, e.g., Mathews, supra
note 247, at 904-06; Introduction to the Criminal Provisions,supra note 247, at 126-27.
265. "'[W]illful' is a word 'of many meanings, its construction often being influenced by
its context.'" Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101 (1945) (quoting Spies v. United
States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1943)). See United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 860-61 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Howard v. United States, 377 U.S. 953 (1964). See Mathews,
supra note 247, at 950-51; Note, FederalCriminaland Administrative ControlsforAuditors:
The Needfor a ConsistentStandard, 1969 WASH. U.L.Q. 187, 189-90.
266. 433 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 (1971).
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267
involve a significant risk of effecting the violation that has occurred.
Also relevant is the Supreme Court's language in UnitedStates v. Murdock,2 68 an income tax evasion case:
The word [willfully] often denotes an act which is intentional,
or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental.
But when used in a criminal statute it generally means an act
done with a bad purpose; without justifiable excuse; stubbornly, obstinately, perversely. The word is also employed to
characterize a thing done without ground for believing it is
lawful, or conduct marked by 269
careless disregard whether or
not one has the right so to act.

Based on a literal reading of Murdock, it could be argued that the
terms "willfully" and "knowingly" are synonymous. Indeed, Professor
Loss has suggested that "knowingly" as contained in section 32(a) is
redundant and that "willfully" alone is controlling.2 70 Judge Friendly,
on the other hand, has concluded that Congress deliberately inserted
the "knowingly" requirement in the second clause of section 32(a) to
ensure the inclusion of a term which has "typically [been] associated
with prosecution for acts grounded in fraudulent intent. ' 271 The debate on whether or not a real distinction exists between the terms "willful" and "knowingly" continues.27 2
Even if "knowingly" is read separately, it seems clear that the government need not show, in a prosecution under either section 24 or
section 32, a specific intent on the defendant's part to violate the law. 2 "
It does appear, however, that while the "willfulness" requirement as
interpreted by some courts may be satisfied by the prosecution without
showing an evil purpose by the defendant,2 74 such a showing will be
required when a defendant is criminally charged with a "willful and
267. Id. at 54 (quoting Herlands, CriminalLaw Aspects of the SecuritiesExchangeAct of
1934, 21 VA. L. Rv. 139, 149 (1934)). For a discussion of Peltz, see United States v. Dixon,
536 F.2d 1388, 1395 (2d Cir. 1976).
268. 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
269. Id. at 394-95 (citations omitted).
270. 3 Loss, supra note 262, at 1986-87.
271. United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1396 (2d Cir. 1976).
272. See Introductionto the CriminalProyviions,supra note 147, at 128, 132.
273. United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d at 1397; United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499,
509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972). In Schwartz, the court stated that: "Proof
of a specific intent to violate the law is not necessary to uphold a conviction under § 32(a) of
the Act, provided that satisfactory proof is established that the defendant intended to commit the act prohibited." Id. at 509.
274. See H. SOWARDS, BusINEss ORGANIZATIONS-THE FEDERAL SECURITIES ACT

§ 10.04[1] (1978) [hereinafter cited as SOWARDs].
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knowing" violation under section 32(a). 75
Because of the different constructions the courts have placed on
the term "willfully" as used in the different Acts, and on the term "willfully and knowingly" as used in the Exchange Act, it is difficult to draw
clear distinctions between them. The use of "willfully and knowingly"
in the second clause of section 32, coupled with the mitigating effect of
the last clause in the section, which precludes imprisonment (but not
imposition of a fine) for a violation if the defendant proves that he
lacked knowledge of the rule or regulation, has led some courts to
adopt a less strict definition of willfully as used in the first clause of
section 32 than that ordinarily given to the term.2 76 As implicitly noted
by the Ninth Circuit, it follows that the term "willfully" as used in section 24 of the Securities Act, which does not contain any mitigating
language for lack of knowledge on the defendant's part, may well be
more difficult to prove than "willfully" as used in section 32.277
Even though spec#Fc intent to defraud is not required to establish a
criminal violation of either section 17(a) of the Securities Act or section
10(b) of the Exchange Act when prosecuted vis-a-vis sections 24 and 32,
an intent to defraud must be shown.27 This intent may be evidenced
through conduct designed to deceive, defraud or mislead.27 9 There is
no requirement, however, that the defendant know that he is violating
a specific statute.280 On the other hand, a showing of "good faith," but
not blind faith,281 by the defendant will provide a viable defense to
criminal charges.282
275. See United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d at 1395-98; SOWARDS, supra note 274
§ 10.04[1], at 10-33 to 10-34.
276. United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d at 1397. See United States v. Brown, 578 F.2d
1280, 1284-85 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 975 (1979); United States v. Peltz, 433
F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 (1971); United States v. Chamay,
537 F.2d 341, 351-52 (9th Cir.), cert. deniedsub nom. Davis v. United States, 429 U.S. 1000
(1976).
277. United States v. Brown, 578 F.2d at 1284-85.
278. See note 273 supra;,United States v. Brown, 578 F.2d at 1284-85. See also United
States v. Amick, 439 F.2d 351, 369 (7th Cir.), cert. deniedsub nom, Irving v. United States,
403 U.S. 918 (1971).
279. United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d at 351-52; United States v. Piepgrass, 425 F.2d
194, 198 (9th Cir. 1970). See Introduction to the CriminalProvisions,supra note 247, at 12831.
280. See note 273 supra and accompanying text.
281. Closing one's eyes to what can plainly be seen, or believing the unbelievable, will not
suffice as a defense. See Wall v. United States, 384 F.2d 758, 762 (10th Cir. 1967); United
States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir. 1964). Blind faith can constitute criminal, not
to mention civil, recklessness sufficient to sustain a charge of violations of the antifraud
provisions of the Securities Acts. See id.
282. See Mathews, supra note 247, at 954.
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The various culpability standards in criminal cases charging viola-

tions of the antifraud prohibitions of the Securities Acts appear to have
remained intact after the Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst P.
Hochfelder.2 8 3 In Hochfelder, the Court reasoned that the "manipulative," "deceptive" and "device or contrivance" language as used in section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, connotes intentional or willful

conduct.2 84 While the prior formulations of the state of mind requirements may have been affected by Hochfelder, it would appear that they

were not;285 the question, however, has not been definitively decided.

28 6
In addition to the federal securities laws, the Mail Fraud Statute
has frequently been employed in criminal prosecutions involving ac-

countants.287 The statute prohibits the use of the mails in furtherance
of a scheme or artifice to defraud.28 8 Allegations of mail fraud and
securities law violations are often joined in a single indictment. 28 9 Because the Mail Fraud Statute, like certain provisions of the securities

laws, 29 reaches schemes to defraud, "it is not essential that the Government allege or prove that purchasers were in fact defrauded. 29 '
Moreover, "reckless disregard for the truth of a statement is sufficient

283. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). The same conclusion appears to be true after the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980).
284. 425 U.S. at 199.
285. Introduction to the CriminalProvisions,supra note 247, at 130-31.
286. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (Supp. 1979).
287. See, e.g., United States v. Bruce, 488 F.2d 1224, 1225 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 825 (1974); United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 856 (2d Cir. 1964); United
States v. White, 124 F.2d 181, 182 (2d Cir. 1941).
288. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (Supp. 1979) provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away,
distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or
intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of
executing such scheme or artiface or attempting so to do, places in any post office
or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent
or delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter
or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction
thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to
whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1000
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
289. United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1399 (2d Cir. 1976). See United States v.
Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 310 (1st Cir. 1980).
290. E.g., section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976). In Bruce, the Fifth
Circuit commented on the similarities between the Mail Fraud Statute and section 17(a).
488 F.2d at 1229-30.
291. United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d at 1399 n.l I (quoting United Staies v. Andreadis,
366 F.2d 423, 431 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967)). Note, however, that
although the government need not show that purchasers were defrauded, "this does not
mean that the government can escape the burden of showing that some actual harm or
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to sustain a conviction for securities or mail fraud.
B.

292

Criminal Case Law

With the foregoing principles in mind, the following discussion
will analyze the more significant cases involving accountants' criminal
liability. The first such case is United States v. White, 293 where the defendant, a public accountant, was charged with preparing false
financial statements that were contained in prospectuses mailed to investors. The prosecution was unable to prove directly that the defendant knew the statements were false but instead relied on the inference
that an accountant of the defendant's experience and intelligence could
not have permitted such gross irregularities to pass without becoming
aware of the underlying fraud. 294 In affirming the defendant's conviction for mail and securities fraud, Judge Learned Hand observed:
It is true that all these instances, taken singly, do not
prove beyond question that [the defendant] knew that the
statements which he prepared were padded with false entries;
but logically the sum is often greater than the aggregate of the
parts, and the cumulation of instances, each explicable only
by extreme credulity or professional inexpertness, may have a
probative force immensely greater than any one of them
alone.

2 95

Implicit in Judge Hand's statement is the idea that an accountant
cannot close his eyes to the presence of fraud.29 6 The accountant in
White argued in defense that he -committed no act knowingly, but
rather took information from the books of the company and from those
who managed the company, and placed such information in the
financial statements. 297 To this Judge Hand responded: "[Flaced with
the choice of finding him a knave or a fool, we cannot say that the jury
was bound to acquit him; fair men might have had no compunction in
refusing to believe that he was so credulous or so ill acquainted with his
injury was contemplated." 536 F.2d at 1399 n.l1 (quoting United States v. Regent Office
Supply Co., 421 F.2d 1174, 1180 (2d Cir. 1970)).
292. Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1336-37 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970
(1978) (securities fraud); United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 135S-59 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978) (mail fraud).
293. 124 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1941).
294. Id. at 182.
295. Id. at 185.
296. See Note, Criminal Liability of Public Accountants: A Lurking Nightmare? 67 J.
CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 32, 36-37 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Lurking Nightmare];text
accompanying note 302 infra.
297. 124 F.2d at 182.
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calling as a finding of innocence demanded."2 98
Judge Hand's suggestion that an accountant may not legally ig-

nore the presence of fraud became explicit in United States v. Benjamin,2 99 in which a certified public accountant, who prepared pro forma
statements relating to the financial structure of his client, rendered false
reports stating that certain auditing work had been performed and certain assets existed when, in reality, no examination or verification procedures had been used.3 " ° Rejecting the defendant's contention that
the evidence against him was insufficient to prove the state of mind

necessary for a criminal conviction, Judge Friendly responded that the
government could "meet its burden by proving that a defendant closed
his eyes to facts he had a duty to see,. . . or recklessly stated as facts

things of which he was ignorant." '0 1 Of particular relevance, Judge
Friendly reflected:

In our complex society the accountant's certificate and the
lawyer's opinion can be instruments for inflicting pecuniary
loss more potent than the chisel or the crowbar. Of course,
Congress did not mean that any mistake of law or misstatement of fact should subject an attorney or an accountant to
criminal liability simply because more skillful practitioners
would not have made them. But Congress equally could not

have intended that men holding themselves out as members
of these ancient professions should be able to escape criminal

liability on a plea of ignorance when they have shut their eyes
to what was plainly to be seen or have represented a knowl-

edge they knew they did not possess.30 2

298. Id. at 185.
299. 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
300. Id. at 856-60.
301. Id. at 862 (citations omitted).
302. Id. at 863. In upholding the accountant's conviction, the court also enunciated the
following principle regarding the requisite state of mind:
It is true that the Government had not merely to show that the statements were
false but to present evidence from which the judge could be convinced beyond
reasonable doubt of [the accountant's] culpable state of mind. But, as Judge
Hough said for this court years ago, "when that state of mind is a knowledge of
false statements, while there is no allowable inference of knowledge from the mere
fact of falsity, there are many cases where from the actor's special situation and
continuity of conduct an inference that he did know the untruth of what he said or
wrote may legitimately be drawn.". . . Any accountant must know that his obligations in certifying "pro forma" statements are not satisfied by any such arithmetical exercise as [the defendant accountant] performed. But, as our description of
the reports has indicated, there were further false assertions, some of them clearly
known to [defendant] to be such; these constituted a basis for holding him that was
independent of the falsity of the total report, as well as for discrediting his assertions of ignorance as to what was required of him.

1980]

ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY

One question that remained unanswered after White and Benjamin was whether compliance with generally accepted accounting principles or generally accepted auditing standards immunized an auditor
from criminal -liability. In United States v. Simon, 30 3 this question was
addressed. As stated earlier, 4 Simon involved the conviction of three
accountants of an internationally known firm for designing and certifying misleading and false financial statements. Specifically, the accountants were accused of drawing up a footnote to their client's financial
statements which concealed looting of the corporation by its president.3 °5 At their trial, eight expert independent accountants testified
that, with the exception of one error, the footnote was not inconsistent
with either GAAP or GAAS.3 °6
The defendants requested a jury instruction that would make
proof of compliance with GAAP a valid defense so that if the financial
statements as a whole did not fairly reflect the corporation's financial
condition, a guilty verdict could be returned only if such deviation
from accepted standards "was due to willful disregard of those standards with knowledge of the falsity of the statements and an intent to
deceive. '"3 °7 The trial judge refused to give the requested instruction
but rather instructed the jury that the "critical test" was whether the
financial statements as a whole fairly and accurately presented the corporation's condition, and, if not, whether the defendants had acted in
good faith. Proof of compliance with generally accepted standards, the
trial judge instructed, should be "evidence which may be very persuasive but not necessarily conclusive that he acted in good faith. . . 30
On appeal, the Second Circuit upheld the propriety of the trial
judge's instruction, noting, however, that proof of compliance with generally accepted standards may be a valid defense as to questions of
overall fair presentation in those instances where the auditor can point
to specific GAAP rules or prohibitions. 0 9 Writing for the court, Judge
Friendly expanded upon the relationship of GAAP to an auditor's responsibilities once he discovers or has reason to believe that there is
fraud afoot:
Id. at 861-62 (citations omitted).
303. 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970).
304. See notes 82-87 supra and accompanying text.
305. 425 F.2d at 799-804.
306. Id. at 805.
307. Id.
308. Id See United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 785-86 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
99 S. Ct. 568 (1979) (citing Simon as authority for particular jury instructions).
309. 425 F.2d at 806.
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Generally accepted accounting principles instruct an accountant what to do in the usual case where he has no reason to
doubt that the affairs of the corporation are being honestly
conducted. Once he has reason to believe that this basic as-

sumption is false, an entirely different situation confronts him.
Then, . . . he must "extend his procedures to determine
whether or not such suspicions are justified." If. . . his suspicions [are] confirmed, full disclosure must be the rule, unless

he has made sure the wrong has been righted and procedures
to avoid a repetition have been established ....

In UnitedStates v. Weiner,3 " a more recent case involving an issue
akin to that presented in Simon, three accountants employed as auditors for Equity Funding Corporation argued that they approved of and
concurred in the grossly misleading financial statements in the good
faith belief that such statements were accurate representations of the

actual financial condition of the company.31 2 One issue raised in connection with this defense was whether the defendants, in auditing Equity Funding's financial statements, complied with both GAAS and
GAAP. Relying on Simon, the Ninth Circuit held that, although not
conclusive, evidence regarding compliance with GAAS and GAAP was
a relevant consideration in the jury's determination of whether the defendants acted with knowledge and willfulness as required by section
32(a) of the 1934 Act with respect to reports or other documents filed
31 3
with the Commission.
310. Id. at 806-07. Also relevant is the following statement by the Simon court:
We join defendaits' counsel in assuming that the mere fact that a company has
made advances to an affiliate does not ordinarily impose a duty on an accountant
to investigate what the affiliate has done with them or even to disclose that the
affiliate has made a loan to a common officer if this has come to his attention. But
it simply cannot be true that an accountant is under no duty to disclose whaL he
knows when he has reason to believe that, to a material extent, a corporation is
being operated not to carry out its business in the interest of all the stockholders
but for the private benefit of its president. For a court to say that all this is immaterial as a matter of law if only such loans are thought to be collectible would be to
say that independent accountants have no responsibility to reveal known dishonesty by a high corporate officer. If certification does not at least imply that the
corporation has not been looted by insiders so far as the accountants know, or, if it
has been, that the diversion has been made good beyond peradventure (or adequately reserved against) and effective steps taken to prevent a recurrence, it would
mean nothing, and the reliance placed on it by the public would be a snare and a
delusion.
Id. at 806.
311. 578 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1978).
312. Id. at 784.
313. Id. at 785-86. Commenting on the defendants' state of mind, the Ninth Circuit
stated:
The overwhelming scope of the fraud, its often complex but sometimes very simple
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l314
n
The Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Nateli,
which the court affirmed the conviction of a partner in a major international accounting firm for violating section 32(a) of the 1934 Act, is also
significant. In Nate/li, the violations arose out of a proxy statement
issued by National Student Marketing Corporation (Marketing) and
filed with the SEC. The indictment charged that the partner and an
audit supervisor, whose conviction was reversed by the court of appeals, 31 5 created a materially false and misleading explanatory footnote
in the proxy statement by attempting to reconcile certain income statement accounts. The indictment also charged the accountants with
knowledge of Marketing's materially overstated net sales and earnings
interim financial statements
as they were reflected in the nine-month
16
included in the proxy statement?

On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected the partner's contention
that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that he
knowingly committed the acts charged in the indictment. As to the
false footnote, the court noted that the footnote was the only place in
the proxy statement where an interested investor could compare Marketing's performance, as evidenced in its previous 1968 Annual Report,
with its 1969 performance, as retroactively adjusted, separate and apart
from the sales and earnings of the companies that Marketing had acquired in fiscal 1969. Under such circumstances, the accountant partner had a duty to correct the earlier financial statement. Knowing that
the 1968 audited statement was being relied upon and used continuously, he nevertheless concealed the fact that Marketing had taken sub1968 statement had been disseminated, to
stantial write-offs after the
31 7
reflect a loss for the year.
Regarding the unaudited interim financial statement, the court of
appeals noted that the partner failed to verify a significant transaction
that had occurred under very suspicious circumstances and that had
been entered in Marketing's books and reflected in the financial statemechanisms, and the failure of the auditors to find in any of the suspicious procedures cause to dig further into Equity Funding's financial records system all lead to
the inescapable conclusion that defendants were involved. Even if they did not
initially know or indeed learn the step-by-step fictitious entries and improper manipulations, their consistent failure to apply GAAS and GAAP after they knew
some kind of a major fraud was afoot provided a basis from which the jury could
reasonably infer defendants' knowing and willful participation in the fraud.
Id. at 784-85.
314. 527 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976).
315. Id. at 325.
316. 527 F.2d at 314.
317. Id. at 317, 319.
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ments just prior to the printing of the proxy statement.318 On appeal,
the partner argued that he had no duty to verify the earnings statement
within which the last minute transaction was included because it was
unaudited. Rejecting this argument, the Second Circuit observed that
he was "associated" with the unaudited statement and was required to
object to any matter that he knew was materially false. 319 While noting
that in the ordinary case an auditor would not be liable because he
neglected to uncover the invalidity of booked accounts receivable, the
court observed that, in the case at bar, the partner "knew" about Marketing's dismal history of reporting inaccurate earnings. The court
therefore concluded:
We do not think this means, in terms of professional standards, that the accountant may shut his eyes in reckless disregard of his knowledge that highly suspicious figures, known to
him to be suspicious, were being included in the unaudited
earnings figures
with which he was "associated" in the proxy
3 20
statement.
Natelli'ssignificance and possible impact must be underscored. At
the time it was decided, it was perhaps the first criminal case under the
federal securities laws where liability was imposed upon a certified
public accountant with respect to an "unaudited" financial statement. 321 A sibsequent state civil case has extended Natellis' reasoning
318. As the court remarked:
The Eastern contract was a matter for deep suspicion because it was substituted so rapidly for the Pontiac contract to which [the partner] had objected, and
which had, itself, been produced after the end of the fiscal period, though dated
earlier. It was still another unbilled commitment produced by Marketing long after the close of the fiscal period. Its spectacular appearance, as [the partner] himself noted at the time, made its replacement of the Pontiac contract "wierd." The
Eastern "commitment" was not only in substitution for the challenged Pontiac
"commitment" but strangely close enough in amount to leave the projected earnings figures for the proxy statement relatively intact. Marketing had only time logs
of a salesman relating to the making of the proposals but no record of expenditures
on the Eastern "commitment," no record of having ever billed Eastern for services
on this "sale," and not one scrap of paper from Eastern other than the suddenlyproduced letter. Nevertheless, it was booked as if more than $500,000 of it had
already been earned.

Id. at 320.
319. Id. An auditor is "associated" with unaudited financial statements "when he has
consented to the use of his name in a report, document or written communication setting
forth or containing statements." AICPA, Professional Standards*No. I § 516.03 (1977).
320. 527 F.2d at 320. See Lurking Nightmare, supra note 296, at 40-42.
321. See Bonhiver v. Graff, 311 Minn. 111, 117, 248 N.W.2d 291, 297 (1976) (citations
omitted):
All accountant malpractice cases called to our attention have involved accountants
who prepare or certify completed financial statements. No case cited by the parties
passes on the liability of a certified public accountant when his work product is not
a completed financial statement but is rather a set of unfinished workpapers and
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to impose liability for the preparation of erroneous workpapers and the
making of erroneous adjusting entries intended for an insurance company's books and records. 322 The Minnesota State Commissioner of
Insurance and his examiners had relied on a private accountant's
workpapers and entries to conclude that the insurance company under
scrutiny was solvent. After the company collapsed, it was discovered
that the accountant's workpapers and entries were erroneous. In affirming a finding of malpractice against the accounting firm and the
individual accountant, the Minnesota Supreme Court premised its
holding on the fact that "the defendants personally displayed their
workpapers to the state examiners and knew that the examiners were
relying upon them." 3" Based on Natelli's reasoning, there can be little
question that if the accountant had intentionally falsified his
workpapers and the adjusting entries with the expectation that others
would rely upon them to their detriment, criminal liability would be
imposed. Such liability, depending on different factual circumstances,
could rest on such statutes as section 17(a) of the Securities Act, section
10(b) of the Exchange Act, the Mail Fraud Statute, and the antifraud
provisions of the state Blue Sky Laws.
The foregoing discussion suggests that the scope of accountants'
criminal liability is expanding. Simon and Weiner define compliance
with GAAP as a relevant, but not determinative, criterion in assessing a
defendant's liability. 24 Natelli and recent state court decisions have
ramifications of imposing criminal liability upon accountants for preparing workpapers, making adjusting entries and being associated with
unaudited financial statements. In light of these decisions, accountants
adjusting entries. Only one case passes on the liability of a certified public accountant with respect to an "unaudited" financial statement [ie., Natell.
322. Bonhiver v. Graff, 311 Minn. 111, 248 N.W.2d 291 (1976). See Seedkem, Inc. v.
Safranek, 466 F. Supp. 340 (D. Neb. 1979).
323. 311 Minn. at 119, 248 N.W.2d at 299. The court further remarked: "Defendants not
only had actual knowledge of the fact that representations were being made by use of the
workpapers and adjusting entries, but they made those representations themselves-by personally handing over the workpapers and adjusting entries." Id. Query whether liability
would have been imposed if the insurance company had transmitted the workpapers to the
state examiners without the accountant's knowledge. In an accompanying footnote, the
court asserted that, in such a situation, perhaps liability should not be imposed. Id. at 119
n.4, 248 N.W.2d at 299 n.4. Yet, it is arguable that when an accountant prepares workpapers
and sets forth adjusting entries for the company's books and records, foreseeable reliance by
others could be iOsofacto presumed in some circumstances.
324. Note that Simon dealt principally with compliance with GAAP, while Weiner considered the relevancy of compliance with both GAAP and GAAS. See notes 77-94 supra
and accompanying text; Liebhafsky, Accountants Liablity--Recent Developments, N.Y.L.J.,
July 24, 1979, at 2, col. 1.
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must engage in their professional practice in a most prudent and circumspect manner.
III.

COMMON LAW LIABILITY

Because a wealth of material has been written on accountants' liability under the common law, 325 the following discussion will provide
an overview of accountants' common law liability to clients and to
third parties when either negligence or fraud is alleged.
A.

Liability to Clients

As a general proposition, accountants, as members of a skilled
professional class,3 26 must exercise that degree of care and competence
reasonably expected of persons in their profession in the community.327
Although an accountant is liable to his client for "negligence, bad faith,
or dishonesty, ' ' 32 he is not a guarantor of correct judgment but merely
must perform with reasonable competence.329 If an accountant fails to
perform in accordance with these standards, he may be liable to his
325. See, e.g., Fiflis, supra note 71; Hawkins, ProfessionalNegligence Liability of Public
Accountants, 12 VAND. L. REV. 797 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Hawkins]; Kurland, Accountant's Legal Liability Ultramares to Barchris, 25 Bus. LAW. 155 (1969); Marinelli, The ExpandingScope ofAccountants'Liabilityto ThirdParties,23 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 113 (197 1)
[hereinafter cited as Marinelli]; Mess, Accountants and the Common Law: Liability to Third
Parties,52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 838 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Mess]; Note, Accountants'
LiabilitiesForFalseAnd MisleadingFinancialStatements, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1437 (1967);
Note, Accountants'LiabilityforNegligence-A ContemporaryApproachfor a Modern Profes.
sion, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 401 (1979).

326. "At least since 1905, accountants, in this country, have been accepted as a 'skilled
professional class ... subject generally to the same rules of liability for negligence in the
practice of their profession as are members of other skilled professions."' Stanley L. Bloch,
Inc. v. Klein, 45 Misc. 2d 1054, 1057, 258 N.Y.S.2d 501, 505 (1965) (quoting Smith v.
London Assur. Corp., 109 App. Div. 882, 883, 96 N.Y.S. 820, 820 (1905)). See Gammel v.
Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 72 N.W.2d 364 (1955).
327. See, e.g., Bancroft v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 203 F. Supp. 49, 53 (W.D. La.), aff'd., 309
F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1962). Referring to attorney professional liability, the Supreme Court, in
an 1880 case, stated:
When a person adopts the legal profession, and assures to exercise its duties in
behalf of another for hire, he must be understood as promising to employ a reasonable degree of care and skill in the performance of such duties; and if injury results
to the client from a want of such degree of reasonable care and skill, the attorney
may be held to respond in damages to the extent of the injury sustained.
National Sav. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 198 (1880).
328. 3 T. COOLEY, TORTS 335 (4th ed. 1932).
329. See Stanley L. Bloch, Inc. v. Klein, 45 Misc. 2d 1054, 1057, 258 N.Y.S.2d 501, 505
(1965). See generally In re Kingston Cotton Mill Co., 2 Ch. Div. 279 (1896), in which the
court said that accountants cannot be obligated to "track out ingenious and carefully laid
schemes of fraud where there is nothing to arouse their suspicion. . . ." Id. at 290. The
court concluded that the accountant "is a watchdog, but not a bloodhound." Id. at 288.
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client either for breach of contract,33 ° or alternatively, in tort for failure
to exercise due care.3 3 '
B.

Negligence Liability to Third Parties

The starting point from which to examine accountant common law

liability to third parties based on negligence is Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche.33 2

In that case, Justice Cardozo, writing for the court, refused

to extend the rationale of his prior decision in Glanzer v. Shevard333 to
encompass liability for economic damages caused by the negligent ren-

dering of services by an accounting firm in favor of a third party not in
privity.3 3 4 Unlike Glanzer where reliance by the third party was the
"end and aim of the transaction," 33 the case at bar, Justice Cardozo

concluded, involved an indeterminate class of persons who, currently
or in -the future, might foreseeably rely on the negligently audited
financial statements.3 36 Accordingly, in denying recovery based on
negligence to the third party, Justice Cardozo observed:

If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder,
the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of
deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of a business conducted on these
330. See, e.g., L.B. Laboratories, Inc. v. Mitchell, 39 Cal. 2d 56, 244 P.2d 385 (1952); 1136
Tenants' Corp. v. Max Rothenberg & Co., 27 A.D.2d 830, 277 N.Y.S.2d 996 (App. Div.
1967); Stanley L. Bloch, Inc. v. Klein, 45 Misc. 2d 1054, 258 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1965).
331. As stated by one commentator.
Like other professionals, the accountant usually gets into the position where
he must exercise his professional skill as the result of a contract. The contract says
what he undertakes to do, but the law says he must do it with reasonable care, by
professional standards. If he fails, he may be liable either for breach of his contract, in tort, for breach of the general duty to exercise due care, arising out of the
contract relationship.
Hawkins, supra note 325, at 797. Whether the case is pleaded in tort or in contract may be
critical to its outcome. For example, an action stated in tort may be barred by the running of
the usually shorter statute of limitations. See, e.g., Carr v. Lipshie, 9 N.Y.2d 983, 218
N.Y.S.2d 62 (1961); American Indem. Co. v. Ernst & Ernst, 106 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937). Problems may also arise as to the issues of contributory negligence and the remoteness of damages. See Hawkins, supranote 325, at 800-01, 809-12.
332. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
333. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922). In Glanzer,the third party plaintiffs were permitted to recover from the defendant, a public weigher, with whom the seller contracted to
certify the correct weight of the beans which the plaintiff purchased. Because the weigher
knew that the plaintiffs were relying on his certification, the court held that he was liable to
the plaintiffs for negligently overstating the weight. See id. at 239, 135 N.E. at 276.
334. 255 N.Y. at 181-85, 174 N.E. at 444-48.
335. Id. at 182, 174 N.E. at 445.
336. Id. at 183, 174 N.E. at 445-46.
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terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may
not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes to these
consequences.337
As the Seventh Circuit noted in Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst,338

U/tramares set the outer boundary in defining an accountant's common law liability to third parties "for it establishes that there was no
duty owing to all who might foreseeably rely on the accountant's negligent misrepresentations. 339 Based on the Glanzer rationale, however,
Ultramaresleft open the possibility that lack of privity would not preclude recovery when it was specifically foreseeable that the third party
would rely on the accountant's representations. A number of courts,
however, have refused to follow this rationale. Strictly adhering to Utramares, these courts have held that privity is essential to imposing
liability for an accountant's negligence, even when the accountant
knew, or should have known, that the third party was relying on his
representations. 4°
An increasing number of courts, however, have declined to employ
a strict privity rule to bar a third party from recovery. 34' These courts
have diminished the impact of Ultramares,not only by permitting recovery by a foreseen plaintiff, but also by extending an "accountant's
liability for negligence to those who, although not themselves foreseen,
are members of a limited class whose reliance on the representation is
342
specifically foreseen.
337. Id. at 179-80, 174 N.E. at 444.
338. 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
339. Id. at 1107.
340. See, e.g., Stephens Indus., Inc. v. Haskins & Sells, 438 F.2d 357, 359-60 (10th Cir.
1971); Western Sur. Co. v. Loy, 3 Kan. App. 2d 310, 312, 594 P.2d 257, 260 (1979); Investors
Tax Sheltered Real Estate,.Ltd. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 370 So. 2d
815, 817 (Fla. App. 1979) (per curiam); Investment Corp. of Fla. v. Buchman, 208 So. 2d
291, 293-96 (Fla. App. 1968). As stated by the Tenth Circuit in Stephen. "[A]s to third
parties-even those who the accountant knew or should have known were relying on his
audit-liability can be founded only upon fraudulent conduct, and proof of mere negligence
will not suffice." 438 F.2d at 359.
341. See, e.g., Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner & Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847, 851 (4th Cir. 1972); Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 90-93
(D.R.I. 1968); Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1974); Aluma Kraft
Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378, 381-83 (Mo. App. 1973); Shatterproof Glass
Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873, 876-80 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971); Canaveral Capital Corp. v.
Bruce, 214 So. 2d 505 (Fla. App. 1968). See also Kittilson v. Ford, 93 Wash. 2d 203, 608
P.2d 264 (1980) (Hochfelder held inapplicable to state securities statute on the basis that
"manipulative or deceptive" language of section 10(b) not included in Washington statute
and also no analogous or similar legislative history between the Exchange Act and the state
statute).
342. Bonhiver v. Graff, 311 Minn. 111, 128, 248 N.W.2d 291, 301-02 (1976). Accord,
White v. Guarente, 43 N.Y.2d 356, 362, 372 N.E.2d 315, 319 (1977); Hochfelder v. Ernst &
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Indeed, the demise of a strict construction of Ultramareswas forti343 In
fied by the New York Court of Appeals in White v. (uarente.
White, the court that decided Ultramares characterized that case as
holding that "an accountant need not respond in negligence to those in
the extensive and indeterminable investing public-at-large."' 3 " Citing
the Seventh Circuit's decision in Hochfelder for the proposition that
recent cases have extended accountant liability based on negligence,34 5

the White court, in reversing the lower court's granting of a motion to
dismiss, asserted that the third party "was a member of a limited class

whose reliance on the audit'34and returns was, or at least should have
been, specifically foreseen.
Recent decisions have extended this rationale to encompass ac-

countants' liability based on negligence when unaudited financial state-

ments and work papers were relied on by third parties. 347 The extent to
Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1107 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'don othergrounds, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). See
cases cited in note 341 supra. Note that a Missouri appellate court has adopted a balancing
test for determining whether a third party can recover in an action against an allegedly
negligent accountant:
The determination of whether in a specific case the defendant will be held liable to
a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves the balancing of
several factors: (1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the
plaintif; (2) the foreseeability of harm to him; (3) the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury; and (4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered.
Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378, 383 (Mo. App. 1973). This
balancing test is similar to the one that the California courts have applied in cases involving
allegations of attorney negligence when the plaintiff is not in privity with the defendant
attorney. If presented with the proper case, it appears that the California courts would apply
this balancing test to accountants' liability. See Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 342,
556 P.2d 737, 742, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375, 380 (1976); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 650,320
P.2d 16, 19 (1958); Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 110,
128 Cal. Rptr. 901, 905-06 (1976).
343. 43 N.Y.2d 356, 372 N.E.2d 315 (1977).
344. Id. at 361, 372 N.E.2d at 318.
345. Id. at 362, 372 N.E.2d at 319 (citing Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100,
1107 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd on othergrounds, 425 U.S. 185 (1976)).
346. 43 N.Y.2d at 362, 372 N.E.2d at 319. In concluding, the court stated:'
While Ultramaresmade it clear that accountants were not to be liablein negligence on the generalized basis that a contract for professional services creates liability in favor of the general populace, this plaintiff seeks redress, not as a mere
member of the public, but as one of a settled and particularized class among the
members of which the report would be circulated for the specific purpose of fulfilling the limited partnership agreed upon arrangement.
Id. at 363, 372 N.E.2d at 320.
347. See, e.g., Seedkem, Inc. v. Safranek, 466 F. Supp. 340 (D. Neb. 1979); Bonhiver v.
Graff, 311 Minn. 111, 248 N.W.2d 291 (1976). See general Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d
395 (Iowa 1969) where the court stated:
Although in this profession a distinction is made between certified audits where
greater time and effort are expended to verify book items, and uncertified audits
where greater reliance is placed on book items, it is clear to us that accountants, or
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which this erosion of Ultramares will continue is uncertain. Although
some courts continue to adhere to strict privity, 348 there is a growing
number of courts that view a strict application of Ultramaresas unfair
to the innocent reliant third party who should be viewed as a "foresee349
able plaintiff.
C. LiabilityforFraud

Ultramaresprovides the focal point from which to examine an accountant's liability to a third party based on fraud. In holding that the
trial court had erred in not submitting the question of fraud to the jury,
Justice Cardozo concluded that "negligence or blindness, even when

not equivalent to fraud, is nonetheless evidence to sustain an inference
of fraud. At least this is so if the negligence is gross."3 50 Thus, under a
literal reading of Ultramares,although negligence is not a substitute for
fraud, recklessness or gross negligence, depending on the circumstances

of a particular case, may be evidence from which the trier of fact may
draw an inference of fraud.3"5 '
In a later decision, State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst,3 52 the New York

Court of Appeals, relying on its reasoning in Ultramares, held that
gross negligence and "even blindness to the obvious" may constitute
sufficient evidence to sustain an inference of fraud.353 In reversing the
trial court's directed verdict for the defendant and remanding for a new
trial, the high court reflected:
Accountants. . . may be liable to third parties, even where
there is lacking deliberate or active fraud. A representation
certified as true to the knowledge of the accountants when
knowledge there is none, a reckless misstatement, or an opin-

ion based on grounds so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion
any other professional persons, must perform those acts that they have agreed to do
under the contract and which they claim have been done in order to make the
determination set forth and presented in their report. Their liability must be dependent upon their undertaking, not their rejection of dependability. They cannot
escape liability for negligence by a general statement that they disclaim its reliability.
170 N.W.2d at 404.
348. See cases cited in note 340 supra.
349. See cases cited in notes 305, 341-42 supra.
350. 255 N.Y. at 190-91, 174 N.E. at 449.
351. Id. at 186, 190-91, 174 N.E. at 447, 449. As an example, Justice Cardozo stated that
"[e]ven an opinion, especially an opinion by an expert, may be found to be fraudulent if the
grounds supporting it are so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion that there was no genuine
belief back of it." Id. at 186, 174 N.E. at 447. See Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337, 374
(1889).
352. 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938).
353. Id. at 112, 15 N.E.2d at 419.
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that there was no genuine belief in its truth, are all sufficient
upon which to base liability. A refusal to see the obvious, a
failure to investigate the doubtful, if sufficiently gross, may
furnish evidence leading to an inference of fraud so as to impose liability for losses suffered by those who rely on the balance sheet. In other words, heedlessness and reckless
disregard of consequence may take the place of deliberate intention.3 5 4
A subsequent New York Supreme Court case, Duro Sportswear,
Inc. v. Cogen,311 arguably expands the holdings of Ultramares and
State Street to make a finding of gross negligence actionable in itself by
a third party, rather than merely providing an inference of fraud." 6
Although the opinion contains language that supports this construction,3 5 7 that language must be read in the context of the entire holding.
While expressly relying on Ultramaresand State Street in its decision,
the court at no point sought to distinguish those holdings or to expand
their principles. At most, it appears that if the court did hold that gross
negligence was a separate cause of action, it did so on the basis of erroneously applying the New York high court decisions."'
The possibility of liability for fraud to a third party, arising not
from affirmative misrepresentation but from nondisclosure is seen in
Fischer v. Kletz.3 59 In Fischer,the court denied a motion to dismiss a
complaint which alleged that the defendant accountants had a duty to
disclose after-acquired information that the audited and certified
figures in financial statements previously filed with the SEC were
grossly inaccurate. As a general proposition, the court asserted that it
saw "no reason why this duty to disclose should not be imposed upon
an accounting firm which makes a representation it knows will be re354. Id. at 112, 15 N.E.2d at 418-19. For later decisions adopting or commenting on State
Street, see, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 46 n.13 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied,439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F.
Supp. 112, 131-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'dinpartandaff'd inpart,540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976);
Rich v. Touche Ross & Co., 69 A.D.2d 778, 415 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1979).
355. 131 N.Y.S.2d 20, 25 (Sup. Ct. 1954), aff'd, 285 A.D. 867, 137 N.Y.S.2d 829 (App.
Div. 1955).
356. See Mess, supra note 325, at 846-47. See also C.I.T. Financial Corp. v. Glover, 224
F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1955).
357. 131 N.Y.S.2d at 25: "In order for Schwartz to recover damages, it would be necessary for the court to find that Cogan was guilty of gross negligence rather than mere faulty
judgment." Id.
358. See id. at 24-25 (citing State St. Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 112, 15 N.E.2d 416,
418 (1938) and Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 190, 174 N.E. 441, 449 (1931)).
359. 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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The court, however, did not enunciate a

precise rule of liability for nondisclosure, asserting that the weighing of
the potentially significant impact of such a rule upon accountants, lawyers, and business entities vis-a-vis the strong interest of investor pro-

tection should be undertaken only after a full development of the facts
of the case.3 6 '

In summary, Ultramares and its progeny permit third party recovery for deceit, even when "deliberate or active fraud" is lacking.

62

Al-

though not a substitute for fraud, gross negligence may furnish
evidence that leads to an inference of fraud. And, as a final caveat,

nondisclosure of after-acquired information which makes the previous
representation false or misleading may result in the imposition of liability under certain circumstances.
CONCLUSION

The accounting profession presently is engulfed in a dynamic state

of affairs. The days of simple "ticking and footing" have long since
passed. The demands placed on the profession today require acute sen-

sitivity and rapid responses to the needs of our changing and complex
society. From both within and without the profession, rules and regulations are emerging and will continue to emerge and alter the role of
the accountant. Concomitantly, the profession will experience changes
in its responsibilities and, no doubt, an increasing number of liability
claims.

360. Id. at 186. In denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court stated:
The common law has long required that a person who has made a representation
must correct that representation if it becomes false and if he knows people are
relying on it. This duty to disclose is imposed regardless of the interest of defendant in the representation and subsequent nondisclosure. Plaintiffs have sufficiently
alleged the elements of nondisclosure on the part of this "disinterested" defendant.
Accordingly, they must be given an opportunity to prove these allegations.
Id. at 188.
361. Id.at 189. See also 1136 Tenants' Corp. v. Max Rothenberg & Co., 36 A.D.2d 804,
804, 319 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1008 (1971), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 585, 330 N.Y.S.2d 800 (1972).
362. State St. Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 112, 15 N.E.2d 416, 419 (1938).

